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Neuroticism is widely believed to be detrimental to health, but the evidence is mixed.
Many large-scale studies find null or positive effects of neuroticism on mortality and health.
A theory of “healthy neuroticism” was generated to explain these discrepant results.
According to this theory, neuroticism can lead an individual down one of two paths: an
anxiety and stress-ridden path of maladaptive coping and poor outcomes, or a path of
vigilance and proactivity. Trait conscientiousness is thought to be the defining feature of
healthy neuroticism, although studies substantiating this claim are few and far between.
Meanwhile, other important factors - notably, external cues and emotions - are omitted
from these studies altogether.
The current thesis examines the roles of situation and emotion on health in
relationship to neuroticism. Specifically, a model of healthy neuroticism is proposed. In
this model, individuals high in neuroticism respond to threatening situations by feeling
greater anxiety, less depression and less anger. These emotions, in turn, propel individuals
to act in adaptive ways. This model is tested in two studies. In the first, mid-life adults
(N = 1, 499) provide daily reports of their affect (nervousness, depression and anger),
health symptoms and health behaviors. Using a multi-level modeling approach, emotion
scores and health behaviors are estimated from the interaction of trait neuroticism and
daily health symptoms. The residuals of the emotion models are then used to estimate the
residuals of the behavior models, effectively estimating the ‘b’ pathway in a mediation
model. In the second study, freshman students at a private, Midwestern university
xiii
(N = 222) provide weekly reports of their affect (anxiety and sadness), whether they
received grades back on a test or assignment, and academic behaviors (e.g., hours spent
studying). Again, a multi-level model was used to estimate emotion and behavior from
trait neuroticism and feedback on grades, and the emotions residuals were used to estimate
behavior residuals. In addition to the proposed model, each study examined the role of
neuroticism on behavior, the interaction of neuroticism and situation on behavior and the
interaction between emotion and situation.
Little evidence to support the proposed model was found. Importantly, there was also
little evidence that neuroticism or the interaction of neuroticism and situation predicted
behavior. Together these results fail to substantiate either the theory of healthy neuroticism
or the belief that neuroticism has an impact on health (or academic) behaviors. The
current thesis concludes by discussing ways in which personality researchers might improve
their methods of measuring emotion and situation and rethink their approach analyzing
and discussing the role of neuroticism in predicting or explaining adaptive outcomes.
xiv
1. Introduction
Neuroticism is assumed to be a maladaptive trait. There is evidence that neuroticism
is associated with poorer relationships, lower income and worse health (Ozer and
Benet-Mart´ınez, 2005). Lay people seek interventions to reduce their levels of neuroticism.
But the story of neuroticism is not as straight-forward as we would like to believe. While
there are certainly causal pathways linking neuroticism to adverse outcomes, we cannot
characterize this trait as wholly maladaptive for two reasons. First, negative associations
with neuroticism are dogged with methodological issues which can inflate the estimates of
these effects. Second, the literature around neuroticism is mixed, including a substantial
amount of evidence for null and positive effects of neuroticism. I will propose a new model
of the relationship between neuroticism and behavior. In this model, neuroticism predicts
adaptive or maladaptive behavior depending upon the situation at hand. Specifically,
neuroticism will heighten any negative emotions a person feels in response to a situation,
and these emotions will lead to over-sampled engagement in specific behaviors. Whether
these behaviors are adaptive or maladaptive depends on whether a negative emotion has
any utility as a response to the situation.
The motivation for deriving this model stemmed from research on neuroticism and
health. Consequently, the majority of the research presented in this dissertation is situated
within the health domain. However, the theoretical links between neuroticism and behavior
should be broadly applicable. Therefore, this model should apply to a variety of outcomes,
including academic outcomes. The model proposed here will be tested within both the
1
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health domain and the educational domain.
1.1 The negative effects of neuroticism
Neuroticism is defined by negative affectivity of many types (Goldberg, 1993),
including worry, anger, and emotional instability (Weiss and Costa Jr., 2005). Individuals
low in neuroticism are often referred to as “emotionally stable.” People high in neuroticism
are both more likely to experience daily stressful events (Gunthert et al., 1999) and react
more strongly to stressful events than people low in neuroticism (Bolger and Schilling,
2006; Mroczek and Almeida, 2004). Normatively, neuroticism tends to peak in late
adolescence (Roberts and DelVecchio, 2000) and decline through adulthood (Roberts and
Mroczek, 2008).
Neuroticism has been labeled “a psychological trait of profound public health
significance” (Lahey, 2009) because of its associations with a wide range of physical and
mental health problems. Neuroticism is indeed linked to higher mortality in a number of
studies (for a meta-analysis, see Roberts et al., 2007). People with higher levels of
neuroticism have higher rates of chronic diseases, including cardiovascular and pulmonary
disease (Weston et al., 2015) and cancer (Nakaya et al., 2003). Neurotic patients report
more somatic symptoms (Watson and Pennebaker, 1989), have higher body mass indexes
(Terracciano et al., 2009), smoke more cigarettes (Turiano et al., 2015) and drink more
alcohol (Larkins and Sher, 2006). Altogether, these results conjure an image of the neurotic
person as living a short life filled with unhealthy behaviors and illness.
1.2 Methodological issues
Despite the substantial number of results linking neuroticism to poor health, we must
temper our enthusiasm for labeling neuroticism a maladaptive trait. This is because a
number of methodological issues plague these results. Each of these issues potentially
2
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inflates the strength of the relationship between neuroticism and poor health.
The first methodological issue is the use of self-report measures of behaviors and
outcomes. This is problematic in all studies of personality, but especially concerning in the
study of neuroticism. This is especially salient in the health domain. Neurotic individuals
have biased perceptions of their own health, such that they believe themselves to be less
healthy than they are. For example they over-report their weight (Sutin and Terracciano,
2016) and perceive somatic symptoms that have no physical basis (Costa Jr. and McCrae,
1987; Watson and Pennebaker, 1989). Furthermore, neurotic individuals retrospectively
inflate their reports of ill-health. Larsen (1992) asked participants to record the somatic
symptoms they experienced over the day every evening for a week. At the end of the week,
participants were given checklists and asked which symptoms they had experienced and
how severe. Neurotic participants remembered experiencing somatic symptoms that, by
their own account, they hadn’t experienced and rated all their symptoms as being worse
than they had when experiencing them. Given this bias, we should expect neurotic
individuals to self-report worse health than their emotionally-stable counterparts, even if
they are objectively equally healthy. Put another way, self-reports of health may correlate
with neuroticism not because of any actual differences in health, but because of perceived
differences. Moreover, these perceived differences have real-world implications which can
further inflate the relationship between neuroticism and measures of ill-health. Individuals
who believe they are unhealthy are more likely to speak with a physician and thus more
likely to receive a diagnosis or be prescribed medicine. Thus, even carefully worded
self-report questions, like the item “Has a physician ever told you that you have
hypertension?” which is used in the Health and Retirement Study, may still be capturing
bias in that neurotic individuals may be more likely to see physicians in the first place.
Given the inflated effects of self-report studies, it should not be surprising to learn that




The second methodological issue is the use of cross-sectional studies or longitudinal
studies conducted over short periods of time. This is concerning because, as Friedman
(2000) pointed out, while many diseases are associated with neuroticism, “such ties do not
always appear in prospective studies” (pp. 1100). Neuroticism is certainly correlated with
experiencing symptoms of disease, but this does not imply that neuroticism causes or even
predicts diseases. Further complicating the problem is the fact that longitudinal studies
must start before the disease onset if they aim to establish a potential causal link from
neuroticism to disease. To do that, one must operationally define when disease onset
occurs. This is extremely difficult, given the ambiguity around when a disease begins.
Most studies define onset as a formal diagnosis: a physician announces that a patient has
cardiovascular disease and, lo and behold, onset has occurred (e.g., Goodwin and
Friedman, 2006; Weston et al., 2015). But could onset not have occurred when the
patient’s arteries became sufficiently clogged? And what would constitute “sufficiently”?
Does sufficiently clogged occur when the blood flow has slowed by a certain degree? Or
when the first bit of gunk clung to an arterial wall? Does the development of heart disease
not begin when the patient first started eating greasy food? Or stopped eating vegetables?
Or decided he was not going to make exercise a regular part of his day? At what point
does he cross the threshold from healthy to unhealthy?
The ambiguity of disease progression leads to a problem where even most longitudinal
designs fail to capture personality before the disease has begun to evolve in the body.
Take, for example, the prediction of disease by personality up to four years before onset
(Weston et al., 2015). This study attempted to predict onset by selecting only individuals
who were healthy at the first time point and used personality scores to predict their
probability of being diagnosed before the second time point, four years later. While this is
certainly a better test than cross-sectional analyses of neuroticism and health, causality
still cannot be inferred. Many of these illnesses, such as lung disease, are the product of
habits, like smoking, that stretch back more than four years before onset. Some of these
4
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behaviors likely began decades before the study was conducted. Possibly many of these
participants experienced symptoms prior to diagnosis, meaning that they could have been
experiencing symptoms concurrent with the personality assessment. Further complicating
the problem is evidence that changes in health can lead to changes in personality (Jackson
et al., prep). This means that assessments of neuroticism close to a diagnosis could be
capturing the effects of health declines on personality more so than effects of personality on
health declines. This problem of assessing personality too close to disease onset inflates the
relationship between neuroticism and health. Consequently, many longitudinal studies fail
to overcome the problems with cross-sectional analysis of neuroticism and health. Those
longitudinal studies that do go back far enough, such as the Hawaii Personality and Cohort
Study, which assesses personality in elementary school, find limited effects of neuroticism
on health (Hampson et al., 2006).
The third methodological issue is the overlap between the measurement of outcomes
and the measurement of neuroticism. Take one study that examined the association
between neuroticism and body-mass index (Terracciano et al., 2009). This study used the
NEO-PI-R (Costa Jr. and McCrae, 1992) to examine the relationship between personality
and weight at both a trait and a facet level. They found that neuroticism is associated
with higher BMI. Digging deeper, this relationship was driven completely by the facet of
impulsivity. Had they dug deeper still, they would have realized that some of the items
included in this measure of neuroticism explicitly ask whether the participant can control
their eating and cravings (Goldberg et al., 2006). In other words, it is likely that the items
assessing eating behavior are the primary source of shared variance among neuroticism and
BMI (Vainik et al., 2015).1
To some extent, the use of meta-analytic techniques can help us to to better estimate
the true relationship between neuroticism and negative outcomes, if these meta-analyses
1The inclusion or exclusion of specific items may account for differences in effects across studies. However,
the general content of neuroticism remains relatively consistent across measures, so specific items may not
contribute to mixed findings (Goldberg, 1993).
5
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are able to overcome the issues described above. Two such meta-analyses of the
relationship between neuroticism and health overcame the self-report and measurement
overlap problems by assessing the relationship between neuroticism and mortality (a clearly
objective measure of health that includes no items that one could conceivably create to
measure of personality). The first of these found that neuroticism was correlated with
premature death at r = .05 (Roberts et al., 2007). This is smaller in magnitude than the
relationship between mortality and conscientiousness (r = −.09), another trait which
receives a considerable amount of attention for its relationship with health. This effect is
even smaller than the relationship between mortality and extraversion (r = −.07), a trait
which receives comparatively less attention than neuroticism by personality and health
researchers. The second, more recent analysis examined the relationship between
personality and mortality across seven large (ranging from just under 4,000 participants to
a little more than 20,000) longitudinal panel studies (Jokela et al., 2013). This analysis
found that the effect of neuroticism on mortality was non-significant (OR = 1.03, equivalent
to r = .02).2 Again, this is substantially smaller than the effect of conscientiousness
(OR = .88, r = −.07) and even a bit smaller than the effect of extraversion (OR = .95,
r = −.03). Thus, the claim that neuroticism is profoundly significant in terms of health is
overblown in proportion to its effect. Despite the substantial number of studies linking
neuroticism to negative outcomes, the actual strength of this relationship is relatively small.
We have addressed the role of neuroticism in predicting adverse outcomes and the
methodological problems that plague these findings. Importantly, this is not an argument
that neuroticism is not linked to adverse outcomes. Despite the issues discussed here, there
is still overwhelming evidence that neuroticism is associated with negative outcomes.
However, you can see that the picture of neuroticism as a maladaptive trait is not as clear
a picture as it could be. The Roberts et al. (2007) study pointed to a number of studies of
2The study only presented odds ratios in the manuscript. To calculate the correlation coefficient, I
followed a procedure outlined in The Cochrane Collaboration (2011): the standardized mean difference was
estimated from the odds ratio using the formula z = ln(OR) 3pi2 . From this z score, a correlation coefficient
was estimated.
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mortality which found a null or protective effect of neuroticism. Jokela et al. (2013)
calculated significant heterogeneity in the effect (I2 = 54%) of neuroticism, indicating that
about half the variability in estimates across the samples may be due to differences in the
samples and not simply error. These mixed results in the literature do more than suggest
that neuroticism is only weakly linked with poor health: they suggest that neuroticism
may be beneficial.
1.3 The positive side of neuroticism
In truth, studies that explore the relationship between neuroticism and outcomes have
mixed results. In the health domain, many studies find that this trait predicts morality,
However, there are a number of large-scale studies which find that neuroticism has no effect
on mortality (Almada et al., 1991; Huppert and Whittington, 2009; Iwasa et al., 2008;
Maier and Smith, 1999). Among older adults, neuroticism often has no relationship with
health and can at times be protective (Korten et al., 1999; Lang et al., 2012; Weiss and
Costa Jr., 2005). Among individuals previously diagnosed with a chronic disease (i.e., heart
disease or diabetes), neuroticism is again protective (Brickman et al., 1996; Ragland and
Brand, 1988). Neurotic women live longer if they are high socio-economic status
(Hagger-Johnson et al., 2012). Individuals who have lost a loved one live longer if they are
higher in neuroticism (Taga et al., 2009). Prospectively, the role of neuroticism as a risk
factor is more limited, in that it does not broadly predict poor health but is only associated
with a few chronic disease (Weston et al., 2015). Overall, the literature on neuroticism and
physical health is mixed.
Given the mixed effects of neuroticism, it is problematic to only discuss neuroticism as
a maladaptive trait. Mixed results suggest the presence of moderating factors. That is,
there are conditions under which neuroticism will be adaptive and other conditions under
which neuroticism will be maladaptive. One theory has been developed to identify these
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conditions. This theory of “healthy neuroticism” posits that neuroticism interacts with
other individual differences to produce differences in behavior.
1.4 Healthy neuroticism
In response to the mixed effect of neuroticism on health, the theory of healthy
neuroticism has been proposed (Friedman, 2000). This theory states that neuroticism can
manifest as adaptive or maladaptive behaviors depending on other characteristics of the
individual. While these characteristics were (at the time) unspecified, it was proposed that
neurotic individuals fell on a spectrum from health to unhealthy. Individuals low in healthy
neuroticism cope with negative emotions by seeking distractions, which are often unhealthy
behaviors like smoking or alcohol consumption. When they see signs of poor health, such
as a mole, they avoid the problem because they find it too distressing to think about. It
was also proposed that individuals low in healthy neuroticism might avoid interpersonal
assistance when in need of medical attention. These behaviors would all contribute to
health problems, and if treatment is not sought or adhered to, those problems might
decline especially rapidly. Healthy neurotics, on the other hand, are too anxious about
their health, so they avoid those unhealthy behaviors. When an individual high in healthy
neuroticism sees a mole, she runs to her doctor for a biopsy. Moreover, she is vigilant.
Because she is anxious about her health, she is constantly on the look out for signs that her
health is deteriorating. In addition, individuals high in healthy neuroticism should
carefully adhere to medication and treatment instructions, which should increase the
effectiveness of those treatments. Overall, healthy neuroticism should be associated with
seeking treatment more often, potentially catching medical problems in earlier stages, and
greater improvement due to medication adherence.
The theory of healthy neuroticism may capture a distinction between conscientious
neurotics and unconscientious neurotics (e.g. Turiano et al., 2013; Weston and Jackson,
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2014). That is, the trait which predicts who among the neurotics will be healthy and who
will be unhealthy is conscientiousness. This trait has been identified due to its known
associations with health. That is, conscientiousness is associated with various health
indices and behaviors, including avoidance of risky health behaviors and greater medication
adherence (Shanahan et al., 2014). Moreover, conscientiousness is partly defined by
self-control. This may allow neurotic individuals to maintain control in the face of stress
and avoid risky coping behaviors, such as by not using alcohol to cope with anxiety.
A graphical depiction of two forms of conscientious neuroticism. If conscientiousness mitigates the
effect of neuroticism, then conscientious neurotics should experience equivalent health status as
conscientious and unconscientious non-neurotics. However, if conscientiousness reverses the effect
of neuroticism, then conscientious neurotics should fare equally as well as unconscientious
non-neurotics and better than both unconscientious neurotics and conscientious non-neurotics.
Figure 1.1: Conscientious neuroticism
Statistically, conscientiousness is thought to moderate the effect of neuroticism on
behaviors and outcomes. The precise form of this interaction is unclear. There are at least
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two ways in which conscientiousness might change the effect of neuroticism (see Figure 1.1
for graphical illustration of the two forms). In one form, conscientiousness mitigates the
effect of neuroticism, such that highly neurotic but conscientious individuals experience the
same health outcomes as emotionally-stable but low-conscientious individuals. For
example, conscientiousness mitigates the relationship between neuroticism and
Interleukin-6 (IL-6), a biological marker of inflammation; neurotic and unconscientious
individuals have high, unhealthy levels of IL-6, but conscientious neurotics have levels that
are similar to those of conscientious, emotionally stable individuals (Turiano et al., 2013).
In the other form, conscientiousness reverses the effect of neuroticism, such that more
neuroticism is healthy when conscientiousness is high and unhealthy when conscientiousness
is low. For example, high neuroticism predicts the least amount of smoking when paired
with high conscientiousness and predicts the greatest amount when paired with low
conscientiousness (Vollrath and Torgersen, 2002; Weston and Jackson, 2014).
Conscientious neuroticism in some ways explains null and positive relationships
between neuroticism and health in the literature. If conscientiousness mitigates the effect
of neuroticism, then over-sampling of neurotic and conscientious participants would yield
null effects for neuroticism: that is, the conscientious neurotics who experience average
health would outweigh the effects of the unconscientious, unhealthy neurotics. By the same
logic, if conscientiousness reverses the effects of neuroticism, then over-sampling
conscientious neurotics would yield positive relationships between neuroticism and health
outcomes. Given that few researchers report, let alone look at, the bivariate distribution of
conscientiousness and neuroticism, it is difficult to determine whether studies might be
over-sampling these populations. One exception is Turiano et al. (2013), which graphically
displayed the distribution of these two traits in order to argue that a sufficient proportion
of their sample could be categorized as conscientious neurotics (see Figure 1.2). This figure
demonstrates that conscientious individuals are vastly over-sampled in this study (i.e., the
Midlife in the United States [MIDUS] Study) compared to unconscientious neurotics.
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This figure demonstrates the potential over-sampling of conscientious, as opposed to
unconscientious, neurotics, which may have yielded null findings for the main effect of neuroticism
on levels of Interleukin 6.
Figure 1.2: The bivariate distribution of conscientiousness and neuroticism, included in
Turiano et al. (2013)
Oversampling of conscientious individuals is likely to happen in any study, especially
longitudinal studies, as these individuals are more likely to participate, more likely to
return and less likely to have passed way between waves of data collection. The study
concluded that conscientiousness mitigates the role of neuroticism. Furthermore,
examination of the main effect of neuroticism yielded a null result. This study illustrates
well what could be occurring in a number of other studies.
Despite its promise, the conscientious neurotic effect is not consistently found in the
literature, much like the effects of neuroticism and health are inconsistent. To be sure,
some of this inconsistency is due to the fact that many studies will not have the power to
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detect these effects. However, even large-scale studies fail to consistently find this effect
(e.g., Turiano et al., 2015; Weston and Jackson, 2014).
1.5 Parallels in other domains
Thus far, we have discussed neuroticism only within the health domain. However,
many of these findings have parallels in other domains. Just as neuroticism is thought to
broadly impact health in a negative way, it is believed that neuroticism has a general
negative impact on occupational and academic success. This is due to findings that
neuroticism may be linked to smaller salaries (Judge et al., 1999), less occupational
attainment, lower satisfaction, and less financial security (Roberts et al., 2003).
Neuroticism may predict poorer academic performance (Chamorro-Premuzic and Furnham,
2003; Furnham and Mitchell, 1991), in part because neuroticism is associated with surface
(as opposed to deep) learning styles, which are inefficient (Busato et al., 2000; Duff et al.,
2004).
Similar to the health domain, the results linking neuroticism to negative outcomes
and maladaptive behaviors is mixed. Firstly, the strength of this relationship is again
comparatively small. A meta-analyses examining the correlation between neuroticism and
occupational outcomes found it to be quite low (|r| range from .05 to .07, compared to the
range of conscientiousness, which is from .09 to .13; Barrick and Mount, 1991). The
direction of the occupational failure association is also mixed. While the relationship
between neuroticism and job performance is generally negative, meta-analytic evidence
suggests that neuroticism positively predicts job performance within the occupation of
professionals (e.g., engineers, architects, lawyers, accountants, teachers, doctors and
ministers; Barrick and Mount, 1991). Despite the findings that suggest neuroticism may be
associated with poor academic performance, several recent meta-analyses concluded there
was no relationship between neuroticism and academic outcomes (O’Connor and Paunonen,
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2007; Poropat, 2009). The overall strength of this association is thought to be around
r = −.03 (O’Connor and Paunonen, 2007), which is again relatively small. In contrast to
health and occupational outcomes, there have not been studies which suggest neuroticism
may benefit one’s academic performance. However, we should note the curvilinear effect of
anxiety on performance (Yerkes and Dodson, 1908) and the relationship between
neuroticism and test anxiety (Schmidt and Riniolo, 1999). The lack of a strong correlation
is not the same as the lack of a relationship. It is quite possible that if researchers were to
search for a curvilinear effect of neuroticism on performance, they may find one.
One key difference between health and the occupational and educational domains is
that, following the surge in evidence that neuroticism may not be all bad, there have been
almost no attempts to identify the conditions under which neuroticism was harmful and
under which it was not. One exception is the suggestion that extraversion may moderate
the effect of neuroticism (Entwistle and Cunningham, 2011), similar to the
conscientious-neurotic effect.
1.6 Filling the gap
Thus far, we have discussed the perception of neuroticism as a maladaptive trait. This
perception is built upon research linking neuroticism to poor outcomes, mainly in the
health domain, but also in the occupational and educational domains. However, these
findings are riddled with methodological problems, including an over-reliance on
self-report, poor use of longitudinal methods and measurement overlap. Importantly,
studies which address these problems often find that neuroticism has, at the most, a very
small relationship with poor outcomes. In both the health and occupational domains, there
is evidence that neuroticism may be beneficial under some circumstances. Health
psychologists have proposed the conscientious-neurotic effect, which suggests that
individuals who are high in both neuroticism and conscientiousness may not engage in the
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same maladaptive behaviors as low-conscientious neurotics. However, the evidence for this
theory is similarly mixed.
Ultimately, the field has failed to comprehensively describe the effect of neuroticism
on major outcomes, most notably health outcomes. Researchers make broad claims about
the maladaptive nature of neuroticism that is not supported by the data. Those who
acknowledged the mixed effects have turned to the healthy neuroticism theory, but this too
does not adequately describe the mixed effects found in the literature. Current attempts to
describe these mixed effects rely on a between-persons theory of neuroticism; that is, some
neurotics behave adaptively and some behave maladaptively. Given the little support of
this theory, I propose we turn to a new conceptualization of adaptive neuroticism: a
within-person theory. Neurotics act adaptively in some situations and maladaptively in
others. The key then to disentangling these effects is identifying the situations in which
neuroticism should be adaptive.
If we are to examine the role of neuroticism in response to specific situations, we must
also consider state-level neuroticism. A person’s reaction to a situation can be partially
described by their state-level personality. A student may have high trait levels of
conscientiousness, but if his response to an upcoming exam is to attend a party instead of
study, his state-level of conscientiousness is both lower than his general trait and more
predictive of his behavior. Trait neuroticism is the tendency to feel anxiety, anger, and
sadness, so state neuroticism is the negative emotions a person is feeling and how strongly.
In other words, state-level neuroticism is simply emotion. Thus, both situation and
emotion need to be incorporated into a comprehensive theory of the relationship between
neuroticism and behavior. The absence of these two factors likely explains the gap in
understanding of neuroticism’s impact on outcomes.
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1.7 The role of situations
The theory of conscientious neuroticism implies that the division between adaptive
and maladaptive neuroticism is at the level of the person: some neurotic individuals behave
in healthy ways, while some neurotic individuals behave in maladaptive ways. However, as
discussed above, the attempt to identify a trait (conscientiousness) which distinguishes
between people has met with little success. I propose that the division truly lies at the
level of the situation: given some situations, neuroticism predicts adaptive behaviors and
given other situations, neuroticism predicts maladaptive behaviors. I arrive at this theory
by examining the difference between studies which found positive effects of neuroticism
compared and those which found negative effects.
Those studies that find positive relationships between neuroticism and health sample
populations who are more likely to have recently faced a situation highlighting a potential
health threat. Older adults should be more aware of possible threats to their health as
their risk for development of illness increases. Indeed, studies which demonstrate null or
positive effects for neuroticism often use samples of older adults (e.g., Korten et al., 1999;
Weiss and Costa Jr., 2005), even showing that these effects are specific to older adults
(Lang et al., 2012). Type A personality, which is often identified as neuroticism, predicts
greater mortality generally, except in men who have had coronary heart disease and are
thus especially aware of their cardiovascular health (Ragland and Brand, 1988).
Neuroticism predicts lower rates of renal deterioration in diabetics, who are acutely aware
of their health behaviors (Brickman et al., 1996). Finally, these effects are not isolated to
those who have experienced a health event but extend to those who have lost a loved one
(Taga et al., 2009) and so may be more aware of their own health. These positive health
outcomes may be partially explained by changes in behavior. Weston and Jackson (2014)
found the conscientious neurotic effect predicted smoking behavior in some patients
diagnosed with chronic disease. However, the effect did not hold for the same participants
in the years before they were diagnosed. Moreover, this effect was only found for chronic
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diseases with direct ties to smoking: diabetes, pulmonary disease and cardiovascular
disease. Given the lack of a pre-diagnosis effect, combined with specificity for diseases
whose prognosis is substantially affected by continued smoking, it seems likely that a
behavior-relevant event must occur to trigger adaptive behavior in neurotic individuals.
1.8 The role of emotions
Once we incorporate situations into our theory of neuroticism, we are faced with a
new challenge. Recall that trait neuroticism is the tendency to experience negative
emotions (including experiencing these emotions more frequently and with greater
intensity). While a person may be more prone to feeling multiple negative emotions overall,
they will not feel all these emotions in a given situation. More to the point, a neurotic
person is generally more likely to feel anxiety, depression and anger than the average
person. However, she will not feel those emotions all the time or to the same degree. When
preparing for a major exam, she may feel more negative than a less neurotic friend. But
when attending a birthday party, she will (hopefully) experience only positive emotions.
But her emotional response to a particular situation is important because it directly
influences her behavioral response (Allen et al., 1992). Consequently, we must determine
the extent to which she feels negatively in a situation to begin to predict her behavior.
Moreover, the specific emotions she can feel come with specific cognitive biases, notably
attentional, memory and perceptual biases (discussed in more detail below), which can
alter her likelihood of engaging in specific behaviors at that moment. So we cannot simply
look at her general emotionality, but we must examine her experience of multiple emotions
in response to a situation. Consequently, three distinct emotions are examined: anxiety,
depression and anger.
Anxiety, depression and anger are known to predict various health outcomes (Achat
et al., 2000; Carnethon, 2003; Jonas, 1997; Kubzansky et al., 1997; Whooley et al., 2008).
16
The role of emotions
These components are more often examined as emotional states, rather than enduring
individual differences. State emotion and trait emotionality are certainly not mutually
exclusive; neuroticism is often characterized as the increased tendency to feel particular
emotions (Goldberg, 1993). But the role of emotions is often ignored in discussions of
personality and prediction. This is problematic for developing a theoretical understanding
of neuroticism, as emotions are believed to serve adaptive functions (Darwin, 1965; Hess
and Thibault, 2009).
Importantly, each of these emotions has been linked to health through physiological
pathways, specifically through activation of the sympathetic-adrenal medulla (SAM), in the
case of anxiety and anger, and the pituitary-adrenal cortex (PAC), in the case of
depression. The physiological response associated with these emotions is not purely
detrimental to health; Mayne (1999) compellingly argues that short-term SAM and PAC
activation allows organisms to recover from negative stimuli and show an increased
production of “natural killer” immune cells, which destroy cancerous and virally infected
cells. Individuals with moderate or high levels of neuroticism should experience SAM and
PAC activation more frequently than individuals low in neuroticism, which in turn should
improve their immune systems. However, chronic activation of these biological systems
wears the body down. Neurotic individuals are also more likely to experience chronic
negative affect, thus the benefits they receive from short-term emotion and penalties they
receive from more chronic emotions might come out to a wash.
Cognitive characteristics of anxiety, depression and anger
Negative emotions, in general, allow us to adaptively cope with threats (Williams
et al., 1988) by changing the way we interpret and process information. Examining these
cognitive processes can help us to understand the behavioral relationships between these
emotions and health, which in turn will allow us to hypothesize the situations under which
these emotions may be adaptive. Anxiety allows us to address impending threats. This can
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be seen by examining the cognitive processes associated with anxiety. When we become
anxious, our attention is more easily directed towards threatening stimuli in our
environment (Atkinson and Litwin, 1960). Persons high in trait anxiety or diagnosed with
anxiety disorders show increased attentional bias for threatening stimuli (MacLeod et al.,
1986; Mineka and Sutton, 1992). Moreover, anxious individuals are likely to perceive
neutral stimuli as more threatening (MacLeod and Mathews, 1988). Anxiety is also
characterized by high arousal (Barrett, 1998). By noticing threats more quickly and having
the energy to act, anxious individuals can respond to a threat before it happens, for
example, by avoiding the threat or by taking action to reduce its likelihood. Thus, it
should be no surprise that anxiety is associated with failure-avoidance motivation (Pekrun,
1988). In summary, anxiety’s function is to propel us to avoid threats by directing our
attention towards potential threats and providing the energy and motivation necessary to
actively avoid those threats.
If anxiety is a forward-looking emotion, then depression is a backward-looking one
(Mineka and Sutton, 1992). Again, the cognitive processes associated with depression
illuminate the function of this emotion. Contrary to anxiety, depression is not associated
with biased attention towards stimuli in the current environment (Mathews and MacLeod,
1994). Instead, depression is associated with biased memories, specifically for negative and
self-referential memories (Blaney, 1986; MacLeod and Mathews, 1991). Depression is also
charactered by low arousal (Barrett, 1998). Instead of avoiding future threats, depression
leads people to ruminate on past traumas or harms (Blaney, 1986). Together, these
cognitive processes coalesce into brooding. Brooding keeps a negative experience in the
front of one’s mind, reinforcing the desire to avoid the experience again. Moreover,
brooding encourages individuals to reexamine the event and identify possible causes. This
can help the person avoid similar situations in the future. The low arousal of brooding
works to slow individuals down and reduce the likelihood they jump into another harmful
experience by accident. The (cognitive) distinction between anxiety and depression is
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perhaps best characterized, in this context, as the former focuses on danger and threat
while the latter focuses on negative self-evaluations and loss (Beck and Clark, 1988).
Like anxiety, anger is associated with attentional and perceptual biases but not
memory biases (Wilkowski and Robinson, 2007) and its adaptive role appears to be
detection of threats (Easterbrook, 1959). Unlike depression, which is very self-focused,
anger predicts cognitive biases which are centered on others. Individuals high in trait anger
attend to hostile stimuli more than individuals low in anger (Smith and Waterman, 2003,
2004) and are more likely to attribute ambiguous actions as hostile aggression (de Castro
et al., 2002). Importantly, anger is thought to be provoked by perceived mistreatment
(Buss, 1961; Spielberger et al., 1985). Overall, it appears that the adaptive role of anger is
to alert organisms to threats perpetrated by others. This can help individuals detect
threats from others and, given the potential for greater arousal (Barrett, 1998), motivate
individuals to address the threat. An important distinction between anxiety and anger is
their relationship to approach and avoidance motivation systems. Anger is believed to
relate to approach motivation, whereas anxiety is avoidance motivated (Carver and
Harmon-Jones, 2009). While anxiety might motivate an individual to avoid a threat (for
example, studying to avoid failing a test), anger may motivate an individual to address the
threat after it has occurred (for example, by arguing with the professor about why the
grade should be changed). We now turn to potential behavior consequences of the different
cognitive biases and motivations of these emotions.
Behavioral consequences of anxiety, depression and anger
We can use the cognitive characteristics of anxiety, depression and anger to
understand why these emotions are associated with health behaviors. Individuals high in
anger are also more likely to cope with negative emotions through unhealthy behaviors.
They are more likely to consume alcohol (Houston, 1986; Leiker and Hailey, 1988; Shekelle
et al., 1983) and smoke (Dembroski et al., 1989; Shekelle et al., 1983; Siegler et al., 1992).
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Angry individuals are also more likely to engage in behaviors that put others at risk, like
driving after drinking (Houston, 1986; Leiker and Hailey, 1988), presumably because their
negative emotionality is directed towards others. Finally, because angry individuals
perceive threats from others, they are less trusting, and consequently are slower to seek
medical treatment and are less likely to comply with a doctor’s instructions (Suls and
Sanders, 1989).
The negative self-evaluations of depression lead to a lower sense of purpose in life,
which in turn gives an individual less motivation to care for themselves. The lack of
motivation, combined with the characteristic anhedonia of depression, implies that when
individuals experience depression, they should engage less in active behaviors that improve
or sustain their health (Harlow and Newcomb, 1986). Consequently, depression is also
linked to lower adherence to medication, poorer dietary compliance, and lower levels of
physical exercise (Kim et al., 2003; Whooley et al., 2008). In addition, depressed
individuals experience more frequent stressors, and thus must engage in coping strategies
more often than those who are not depressed. These individuals may cope through
substance use (Cooper et al., 2000, 1995; Kim et al., 2003; Swendsen and Merikangas,
2000). On a positive note, the expression of depression may signal to close others the need
for social support (Stiff et al., 1988), which in turn serves as a substantial buffer against
the health consequences of stress (Cohen and Wills, 1985).
Given the future-orientation of anxiety, anxious individuals may display greater
vigilance for signs of health problems (Friedman, 2000). Specifically, anxious individuals
should notice changes in their health and perceive those changes as indicators of illness or
disease. For example, an anxious person should be more likely to notice a new mole on
their skin, due to their attention to stimuli, and more likely to perceive it as an indicator of
cancer, due to their perception of neutral stimuli as threatening. As a consequence, anxious
individuals should be more likely to detect cancer and other illnesses at early stages. This
suggests that anxiety – and by extension, neuroticism – may be protective when there is a
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real threat to health, such as early stage cancer. Some support has been found for this
anxious-vigilance hypothesis. Anxious women are more likely to examine themselves
monthly as recommended (Brain et al., 1999; Lerman et al., 1993; McCaul et al., 1998) and
to receive mammograms (Caplan et al., 1996).
However, avoidance of future threats can also manifest as refusing to acknowledge the
threat. Anxious individuals may be equally afraid of receiving a diagnosis as they are of
actually having an illness, and so avoid being diagnosed by refusing to seek even routine
health care. Following this, neuroticism shows a bell-curve relationship with health care
screening (Armon and Toker, 2013). In this study, healthy individuals were recruited after
receiving a routine health examination. Those individuals who had average levels of
neuroticism were more likely to return for a second visit within seven years. However,
individuals either very low or very high in neuroticism were not likely to return for a
second screening. These findings suggest that while individuals with moderate levels of
neuroticism or anxiety may feel motivated to address potential threats, those with very
high levels are more worried about receiving the news and will avoid the diagnosis as a
means of avoiding the underlying health problem. In addition, anxiety and vigilance
towards other domains (e.g., vigilance for problems at work or in relationships) may have
an adverse effect on health. For example, the college student who worries about failing an
upcoming final may address this threat by pulling an all-nighter. His health will suffer from
a lack of sleep. Anxious individuals may also attempt to avoid addressing threats through
substance use (Bonnet et al., 2005; Patton et al., 1998), which have an obvious negative
impact on health, academic performance and other domains. 3
3Given the relationship between substance use and these three emotions, we might expect that trait
neuroticism also predicts smoking and alcohol consumption. Many studies have found this to be true (e.g.,
Eysenck and Eaves, 1980; Mroczek et al., 2009; Terracciano and Costa Jr., 2004; Turiano et al., 2012; Weston
and Jackson, 2014). Yet, like all other findings regarding neuroticism and health, these effects are not reliably
found (Atherton et al., 2014; Hong and Paunonen, 2009).
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1.9 A new model of adaptive neuroticism
The current dissertation seeks to define and test a new model of adaptive neuroticism,
one which incorporates within-person variability in lower-order structures of neuroticism





potential threat State Anger
This model suggests that trait levels of neuroticism are best used to predict within-person
emotional responses to threatening situations. Neuroticism will predict adaptive behaviors when
the situation at hand suggests a probable future threat and the individual feels greater levels of
anxiety and lower levels of depression in response to that situation.
Figure 1.3: A theory of adaptive neuroticism.
Specific situations trigger specific states
Individuals find themselves in different situations over time. Some of these situations
highlight the potential for future harm; when individuals find themselves in such a
situation, they should feel certain emotions, namely anxious or angry. Conversely, when
individuals are not in a threatening situation, they should feel less anxious. They should
also be more likely to feel depressed or angry, not because all situations that are
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non-threatening are also depressing or provoke anger, but because some non-threatening
situations can be depressing or provoke anger. But more than just eliciting emotions, we
should think of these situations as triggering state responses based on the individual’s
trait. So, while in general, individuals should feel more anxious in threatening situations,
neurotic individuals should feel more anxious than anyone else. This is consistent with
trait-activation theory (Tett and Guterman, 2000), which states that the expression of a
trait requires activation by trait-relevant situational cues. In other words, individuals high
in neuroticism should not behave or feel neurotic at all times; rather, when the situation
can elicit negative emotionality, those in high in neuroticism should behave and feel the
most “neurotic.” This explains why neuroticism predicts more negative reactivity to
(Mroczek and Almeida, 2004) and perception of average situations (Rauthmann et al.,
2015).
Specific states predict specific behaviors
When individuals feel anxious in response to potential future harm, they engage in
behaviors which can reduce the likelihood of experiencing harm, or adaptive behaviors.
Because neurotic individuals will feel more anxious, they should be more likely to engage in
adaptive behaviors in response to potential future threat. For example, if an individual
susceptible to migraines feels a headache approaching, they should become anxious. This
anxiety should motivate them to take medication right away, to reduce the likelihood of
experiencing a full migraine.
On the other hand, when individuals experience greater levels of depression and anger,
they should be less likely to engage in adaptive behaviors, if the threat is health related.
Instead, individuals who experience these states should be more likely to act in unhealthy
ways. For example, depressed individuals should be less likely to exercise, and depressed or
angry individuals may use a substance, like alcohol, to reduce their negative affect.
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1.10 The current study
The current study aims to test this model of adaptive neuroticism. To do so, it will
use longitudinal daily-diary or weekly-diary studies which track individuals across short
periods of time: weeks, or even days. Testing the model over this short time-frame is
essential for capturing the daily behaviors which, over time, could improve or sustain the
health of individuals. Moreover, these daily diaries allow for individuals to experience a
variety of situations and events, which may elicit a number of states and behaviors. In
addition, the use of daily-diaries allows us to tease apart facets of neuroticism
within-persons. That is, we can determine whether anxiety, depression, and anger are as
strongly correlated at a state-level as they are at a trait-level. This will allow us to isolate
the mechanisms by which neuroticism can lead to adaptive or maladaptive behaviors.
Finally, while the motivation for the model is grounded in the health domain, the cognitive
biases and motives accompanying these lower-order structures of neuroticism should apply
equally in other domains. So the model of adaptive neuroticism should work to explain
behavior in other domains. Consequently, the current study will test this model in both the
health domain and the educational domain.
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2. Study 1: Health Behaviors
2.1 Study 1 Methods
2.1.1 Participants
Data were drawn from the national panel study, the Midlife in the United States
study (MIDUS; for a review, see Brim et al., 2004). Participants were recuited into this
study between the years 1995 and 1996 through the use of random digit dialing.
Participants were eligble for the survey if they were non-institutionalized, English-speaking
adults (between the ages of 25 and 74) living in the United States. Researchers also
identified eligible siblings and twins within this sample.
Of the full MIDUS sample, a subset participated in the National Study of Daily
Experiences (NSDE). This sample includes 1,499 participants from 1,285 households. On
average, participants (53.57% female) were 45.84 years old (SD = 12.56). White Americans
are over represented at 89.39% of the sample, while African Americans make up only 5.60%
of the sample. The remainder of the sample contains Native Americans, Asians and Pacific
Islanders, Others, Multiracials and nonresponders. The sample is also well-educated:
90.79% of the sample completed high school, 30.89% of the sample completed college and





Personality traits were measured as part of the general MIDUS survey. For these
measures, participants were given an adjective and asked to rate how well the word
described them on a scale from 1 (Not at all) to 4 (A lot). Neuroticism was measured with
the items moody, worried, nervous and calm (reverse scored). Respones were averaged to
create a final trait score for each participant (M = 2.22, SD = 0.66). This four-item
measure shows fair reliability (α = 0.74) and has been used in other panel studies,
including the Health and Retirement Study.
Situation, emotional and behavioral measures were conducted as part of the NSDE.
Participants who were included in this study were called on the telephone every night for
eight consecutive nights. Participants completed between 1 and 8 daily reports, with the
average number of reports being 7.00 (SD = 1.41).
Situation: Physical symptoms
Each day, participants were asked to rate how much of the time that day they had
experienced a number of physical symptoms, from 1 (None of the time) to 5 (All of the
time). These symptoms included aches (i.e., headache, backache, muscle soreness;
M = 1.76, SD = 1.13), cold and flu (i.e., cough, sore throat, fever, chills, flu; M = 1.32,
SD = 0.88), stomach problems (i.e., nausea, diarrhea, poor appetite and other stomach
problems; M = 1.15, SD = 0.56), chest pain or dizziness (M = 1.07, SD = 0.36), other
physical symptoms or discomforts (M = 4.12, SD = 0.32). In addition, women were asked
if they had experienced any menstrual-related symptoms (M = 1.20, SD = 0.71) or hot
flashes (M = 1.11, SD = 0.44). It seems more important to assess changes in a person’s
health, such as new symptoms, than differences in health between people. Consequently,
physical symptoms were person-centered.
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Each of the physical symptoms will serve as situations which suggest possible future
threat. A physical symptom, such as an ache, alerts an individual to health problem. This
may be a relatively minor problem, such as a cold, or a more major problem, like an
infection or a cancerous growth. Moreover, the health threat may be avoided with action
(e.g., if the threat is a cold, the individual might get more sleep). Without further
investigation, the symptom itself is ambiguous. The individual cannot discern whether he
is under grave or minor threat and he cannot know whether his actions will lead to any
change. In such a situation, his best course of action is to assume that his actions can
mitigate the threat.
Emotion
Participants were given a number of items to assess emotion each day. For each item,
participants were asked to rate how much of the time that day they had felt that emotion,
from 1 (None of the time) to 5 (All of the time). Three of these items are used here:
nervous (M = 1.24, SD = 0.60), depressed (M = 1.24, SD = 0.62); and angry/irritable
(M = 1.36, SD = 0.67). Emotions will be grand-mean centered for these analyses.
Person-mean centering was not used, because the theory under consideration asks not only
how individuals respond when they feel more anxious, but whether neurotic individuals feel
more anxious than less neurotic individuals.
Behavior: Health Behavior
Each day, participants were asked to report whether they engaged in a number of
health behaviors. Participants reported on how much time (in hours) they engaged in
vigorous exercise (M = 0.81, SD = 1.64). Participants reported how many cigarettes they
had smoked in the last day. Of participants who were smokers (N = 579), the average
number of cigarettes smoked was 14.05 (SD = 12.57). If non-smokers are included (i.e.,
each of the non-smokers is given a value of 0 for every day they complete the survey), the
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average number of cigarettes smoked is 4.19 (SD = 9.47).
Participants reported how many alcoholic drinks they had consumed in the last day.
Of participants who were drinkers (N = 1, 130), the average number of drinks consumed
was 0.67 (SD = 1.47). If non-drinkers are included, the average number of drinks
consumed is 0.51 (SD = 1.53). Participants also report on how much time (in hours) they
spend sleeping (M = 7.13, SD = 1.46). Participants are more likely to sleep and consume
alcoholic drinks later in the evening, after the daily evening phone interview. Consequently,
the reports of these behaviors for the following day are used in the analyses, instead of the
concurrent day. For example, a participant’s report on the Wednesday interview for his
amount of sleeping and alcohol consumption will be compared to his report on Tuesday of
physical symptoms and emotion. This is because these behaviors are more likely to have
occurred on Tuesday evening, after the Tuesday report.
These behaviors will serve as adaptive (in the case of exercise) or maladaptive (in the
case of smoking and drinking) health behaviors. When faced with an ambiguous but
potentially threatening situation (i.e., a somatic symptom) an individual should increase
their engagement in adaptive behaviors and decrease their engagement in maladaptive
behaviors. Certainly, there will be some differentiation between the specific situations and
behaviors. Dizzy individuals should probably not exercise and so we should not expect the
same increase in exercise in the face of that situation.
2.1.3 Analyses
Four different models will be constructed for each of the behaviors. These models
build incrementally on each other. The first model, a simple one-predictor regression,
represents the typical method of assessing neuroticism in the health domain, and the final
and fourth model represents the most nuanced method of analyzing these data. By
estimating each of these models, the relationship between neuroticism and behavior can be







































Figure 2.1: Four models to be tested. These models progress from most parsimonious to
most complex.
neuroticism may predict behavior.
Relationship of neuroticism and behavior
First, the basic relationship of neuroticism to the individual health behaviors will be
established. This first model represents the most traditional method of assessing the effect
of neuroticism on health. The zero-order relationship will be estimated, as well as the
relationship after controlling for covariates, age and gender. See Panel A in Figure 2.1. An
example, predicting smoking, is shown below.
Level 1: Day Level




Level 2: Person level
β0k = γ00 + γ01(Neuroticismk) + µk
(2.2)
Moderation of neuroticism by situation
Next, the relationship between neuroticism and behavior will be moderated by
situation. This model represents a more nuanced approach to studying the relationship
between neuroticism and health behaviors by incorporating the potential for different
situational effects, as described in the introduction. See Panel B in Figure 2.1. An example
of the equations estimated is shown here, with smoking as the example outcome.
Level 1: Day Level
Smokingjk = β0k + β1k(Symptomsjk) + ejk
(2.3)
Level 2: Person level
β0k = γ00 + γ01(Neuroticismk) + µ0k




Moderation of emotion by situation
Third, neuroticism will be replaced by the negative emotions – anger, sadness and
anxiety – that were measured within-person. This model is incorporated as it covers the
elements deemed necessary and yet missing from the current study of neuroticism and
health (i.e., emotions and situations) but omits the overall trait of neuroticism. See Panel
C in Figure 2.1.
Level 1: Day Level





Level 2: Person level










Fourth and finally, the proposed mediation model will be tested. See Panel D in
Figure 2.1.
A three-level1 hierarchical linear modeling will be used to test the theoretical model.
Level one will be the prediction of a rating from the emotion category (see Equation 2.7).
Two dummy codes will be incorporated to indicate which emotion is the outcome. These
coefficients will represent the average differences in ratings of nervousness (anxiety),
depression and anger. Next, emotion will be nested within days (Level 2). At this level, the
emotion coefficients will be predicted by the amount of time a physical symptom was
present. Only two coefficients (for example, pi0jk and pi1jk) will be allowed to vary across
days (see Equation 2.8). This was done for two reasons: 1) there are not enough
observations in the data to freely estimate all coefficients in this model and 2) there is no
theoretical reason that the difference in ratings of emotion should be systematically
predicted by day in the study. To determine which two coefficients should be allowed to
vary, each possible combination of two will be tested, and the coefficient with the least
variance will be excluded. Days will then be nested within person (Level 3). At this level,
neuroticism will be used to predict all coefficients: intercepts, mean levels of anxiety,
differences between anxiety and the other emotions and the interaction between each of the
emotions and degree of physical symptoms. All coefficients will be allowed to vary at this
level (see Equation 2.9). Residuals from this model will be calculated by generating
predicted values from the fixed effects estimated and subtracting these from the observed
scores. These residuals will become predictors to test the second half of the model.
Level 1: Emotion level
1It must be noted that this three-level model ignores a source of dependence among the data points:
household. Within the data, there are 1,285 households, 203 of which contain two participants and 4 of
which contain three or more participants. To determine whether it was necessary to nest participants in
households for the analyses, I estimated the hierarchical linear model described in this subsection with a
fourth, household, level and allowed the intercept to vary at this level. I estimated this model for each of the
seven symptoms. The ICC of household ranged from 0.08 to 0.15 (M = 0.11). Given the relatively small
variance explained by household, I chose to drop this level for the sake of parsimony.
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Ratingijk = pi0jk + pi1jk(IsDepressionijk) + pi2j(IsAngerijk) + eijk
(2.7)
Level 2: Day level
pi0jk = β00k + β01k(Symptomsjk) + r0jk
pi1jk = β10k + β11k(Symptomsjk)
pi2jk = β20k + β21k(Symptomsjk)
(2.8)
Level 3: Person level
β00k = γ000 + γ001(Neuroticismk) + µ0k
β01k = γ010 + γ011(Neuroticismk) + µ1k
β10k = γ100 + γ101(Neuroticismk)
β11k = γ110 + γ111(Neuroticismk)
β20k = γ200 + γ201(Neuroticismk)
β21k = γ210 + γ211(Neuroticismk)
(2.9)
This model will be run three times, once with each emotion serving as the reference
group, to estimate the pathways from neuroticism and situation to emotion, and to
formally test whether neuroticism, situation and their interaction predict these emotions
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differently (shown in Figure 2.2).
A similar set of equations will be used to predict the effect of neuroticism and
situation on the behaviors. Because each behavior is measured using a different scale (e.g.,
number of hours, number of drinks, etc.), separate models will be used to estimate each
behavior. Consequently, two-level (instead of three-level) models will be used. An example
of the smoking model is described below.
Level 1: Day Level
Smokingjk = β0k + β1k(Symptomsjk) + rjk
(2.10)
Level 2: Person level
β0k = γ000 + γ01(Neuroticismk) + µk
β1k = γ010 + γ11(Neuroticismk) + µk
(2.11)
After using neuroticism and situation to estimate both emotion and behavior, the
residuals of these two models will be used to estimate the pathways from emotion to
behavior. This procedure imitates traditional mediation models, by estimating the
pathways from the mediators (emotions) to the outcome (behavior) after controlling for the
predictors (neuroticism and situation).
For all models, bootstrapping will be used to estimate the coefficients (the median




Level 1: Day Level
Behaviorij = β1j(Nervousij) + β2j(Depressionij) + β3j(Angerij) + eij
(2.12)
Level 2: Person Level
β0j = γ00 + µ0j
β1j = γ10 + µ1j
β2j = γ20 + µ2j
β3j = γ30 + µ3j
(2.13)
This entire model estimate procedure will be used to estimate the models with each of
the situations or physical symptoms (aches, throat problems, stomach issues, dizziness,
menstrual pains, hot flashes and other) leading to each of the health behaviors (exercise,
sleep, smoking and drinking) through the emotions, resulting in a total of 28 models.
2.1.4 Hypotheses
It is hypothesized that individuals high in neuroticism will experience higher levels of
each emotion overall. That is, the mean level of anger, anxiety and depression should
increase as participants increase in trait neuroticism. Experiencing more physical
symptoms is expected to increase experiences of anxiety and decrease experiences of anger
and depression. Finally, greater anxiety in the face of physical symptoms is hypothesized







potential threat State Anger
These pathways will be estimated using three
hierarchical linear models. Residuals from this
model will be saved, and these residuals will be
used to test the second half of the model.
Figure 2.2: The first half of the model, pre-





potential threat State Anger
These pathways will be estimated using the
residuals from models predicting emotion and
behavior from the interaction of neuroticism
and situation.
Figure 2.3: The second half of the model, pre-
dicting behavior from emotion.
participation in unhealthy behaviors (drinking and smoking). Greater levels of anger and
depression are hypothesized to have the opposite effect on health behaviors.
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2.2 Study 1 Results
All analyses in this document were performed using R. The version number and
packages loaded are listed in Appendix A.
Three methods were used to calculate correlations. When calculating correlations
between person-level variables, the scores on each variable were used and the sample size
was the number of people who had completed both measures. When calculating
correlations between day-level variables, the scores on each variable were used and the
sample size was the number of observations that had scores on measures. When calculating
correlations between one day-level variable and one person-level variable, the average day
level score and the score on the person-level variable was used, and the sample size was the
number of people who had completed the day-level variable once and had completed the
person-level variable. A full correlation matrix can be found in Table 2.1.
Neuroticism was positively correlated with greater experience of feeling nervous
(r = 0.35), depressed (r = 0.33), and angry (r = 0.32). Neuroticism was also positively
associated with smoking cigarettes (r = 0.04), but was not associated with drinking alcohol
(r = 0.01), vigorous exercise (r = −0.01) or hours of sleep (r = 0.01). The three emotions
were correlated with the health behaviors. Specifically, nervousness was positively
associated with smoking (r = 0.05) and negatively associated with sleep (r = −0.03).
Depression was positively associated with smoking (r = 0.09) and exercise (r = 0.02) and
negatively associated with sleep (r = −0.02). Anger was positively associated with both
exercise (r = 0.03) and sleep (r = −0.03). Cigarette smoking, alcohol consumption and
hours of sleep were not correlated with any of the symptoms. However, vigorous exercise
was positively associated with a number of symptoms: aches (r = 0.05), hot flashes and
feeling flushed (r = 0.03) and other physical symptoms and discomforts (r = 0.03).

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2.2.1 Model 1: Neuroticism predicting behavior
The first model tested is the simple model predicting behavior from neuroticism.
Multilevel models are used for this, with days nested within person. The effect of this is to
estimate a “true score” of behavior for each participant from their behavior across days.
All models control for age, gender and the self-rated health of the participant.2 After
estimating the models, simple diagnostics were run. Relevant plots are presented in Figure
2.4. These include histograms of the outcome measures and Q-Q normality plots of the
residuals. Both sets of diagnostics indicate that all outcomes of interest are highly skewed
and the residuals are non-normally distributed.
Given the violation of the normality assumptions of regression, bootstrapping with
1,000 iterations was used to estimate the coefficients and their significance. The use of
bootstrapping overcomes problems with skewed distributions and allows for unbiased
estimation of the coefficients and their uncertainty. The median of the resulting
distribution was used as the coefficient estimate, and the percentile method was used to
estimate the 95% confidence interval. If this interval did not contain 0, the coefficient was
determined to be statistically significant. This bootstrapping approach was applied to all
models in this thesis, to address the continued problems of non-normally distributed
outcomes and for consistency across methods. Results are presented in Table 2.2.
The results of these models were consistent: neuroticism was not a significant
predictor of health behaviors after controlling for age, gender and self-rated health. More
specifically, neuroticism did not predict the number of cigarettes smoked by smokers
(B = 0.56, 95% CI = [−0.96, 2.19]) the number of alcohol drinks consumed by drinkers
2All models were tested with and without these covariates and with the predictor variable(s) interacting
with each of the covariates. The use of these covariates did not change the results of the study, and in many
cases changed the size of the coefficients by less than one tenth of a unit. There was one exception: removing
self-rated health did allow for neuroticism and nervousness to predict cigarette smoking. I decided to keep
self-rated health in for two reasons. First, this provided the most conservative test of the models. Second, the
symptom variables were within-person centered, which does more closely reflect an individual’s experience
of changes in their health but also removes between-person variability in health. By adding self-rated health
to the model, we can better account for between-person variability in general health.
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Q−Q Plot for smoking model 
















































Q−Q Plot for alcohol consumption model 







































Q−Q Plot for exercise model 

















































Q−Q Plot for sleep model 


























Diagnostic plots of health study models of neuroticism predicting behavior show that assumptions
of normality have been violated. Bootstrapping is employed to address this problem.
Figure 2.4: Diagnostic plots of health study models
(B = 0.04, [−0.12, 0.20]), the number of hours exercised (B = 0.01, [−0.10, 0.12]), or the




Cigarettes Drinks Vigorous Exercise Sleep
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept 23.58∗ 1.68∗ 1.15∗ 6.99∗
(15.92,31.47) (0.97,2.35) (0.60,1.68) (6.58,7.39)
Neuroticism 0.56 0.04 0.01 0.02
(-0.96,2.19) (-0.12,0.20) (-0.10,0.12) (-0.07,0.10)
Gender -4.81∗ -0.74∗ -0.33∗ 0.05
(-6.93,-2.59) (-0.93,-0.55) (-0.48,-0.19) (-0.06,0.16)
Age 0.05 0.001 -0.004 0.01∗
(-0.04,0.15) (-0.01,0.01) (-0.01,0.002) (0.003,0.01)
Self-Rated Health -2.29∗ -0.10 0.05 -0.07∗
(-3.69,-1.02) (-0.21,0.02) (-0.03,0.13) (-0.13,-0.01)
Observations 2,332 3,735 8,348 8,018
Log Likelihood -7,637.90 -7,831.25 -15,606.77 -13,487.09
Note: ∗p < .05
Table 2.2: Predicting health behaviors from trait neuroticism (Model 1)
2.2.2 Models 2 and 3: The interaction of neuroticism or emotion
and situation in predicting behavior
Next, models two and three were estimated. In model two, situation (i.e., physical
symptoms) interacts with neuroticism to predict behavior. In model three, situation
interacts with each of the daily negative emotions (nervousness, depression and anger) to
predict behavior. Separate models are created for each combination of situations and
behavior. Each model controls for age, gender and self-rated health. Results are grouped
by physical symptom, to aid with description and interpretation.
The results for models two and three predicting behavior from symptoms of aches and
pain (interacting with trait neuroticism and daily negative emotion) are presented in Table
2.3. Neuroticism and aches did not significantly interact to predict any of the health
behaviors. Aches also did not interact with feeling nervous, depressed or angry to predict
health behaviors.
The results for models two and three predicting behavior from cold and flu symptoms
(interacting with trait neuroticism and daily negative emotion) are presented in Table 2.4.
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Neuroticism and cold/flu symptoms did not significantly interact to predict any of the
health behaviors. Cold and flu symptoms also did not interact with feeling nervous,
depressed or angry to predict health behaviors.
The results for models two and three predicting behavior from stomach and digestive
issues are presented in Table 2.5. Neuroticism and stomach and digestive issues did not
significantly interact to predict any of the health behaviors. Digestive issues also did not
interact with feeling nervous, depressed or angry to predict health behaviors.
The results for models two and three predicting behavior from chest pain and
dizziness are presented in Table 2.6. Neuroticism and dizziness did not significantly
interact to predict any of the health behaviors. Dizziness also did not interact with feeling
nervous, depressed or angry to predict health behaviors.
The results for models two and three predicting behavior from menstruation-related
symptoms are presented in Table 2.7. As a reminder, only women were included in these
analyses. Neuroticism and menstruation symptoms did not significantly interact to predict
any of the health behaviors. Being angry interacted with these symptoms to predict
cigarette smoking (B = −0.99, [−1.94,−0.03]). More specifically, feeling angry had no
effect on smoking when menstrual symptoms were low; when menstrual symptoms were
one group standard deviation below an individual’s mean, the slope of angry on smoking
was not significantly different from 0 (B = 0.17 [−0.65, 0.97]). Yet when menstrual
symptoms were high, one group standard deviation above an individual’s mean, being
angry lead to a reduction in cigarette smoking (B = −0.92 [−1.70,−0.08])3. This effect
was in the opposite direction hypothesized: it was expected that feeling angry would lead
to unhealthy behaviors, especially when feeling angry was a response to a health situation.
Here, being angry in response to health symptoms lead to healthier behavior.Menstruation
symptoms did not interact with feeling nervous or depressed to predict health behaviors.
3Simple slopes were calculating by recentering the symptom variable - either by subtracting the group
standard deviation from the within-person centered variable, to center at a “high” level or by adding the
standard deviation to center at a “low” level, re-estimating the model and then running the bootstrap
procedure to estimate the coefficients and confidence intervals.
42
Study 1 Results
The results for models two and three predicting behavior from hot flashes and feeling
flushed are presented in Table 2.8. Again, only women were included. Neuroticism and hot
flashes did not significantly interact to predict any of the health behaviors. Hot flashes also
did not interact with feeling nervous, depressed or angry to predict health behaviors.
The results for models two and three predicting behavior from other, unlisted
symptoms are presented in Table 2.9. Being nervous interacted with other symptoms to
predict cigarette smoking (B = 1.30, [0.11, 2.57]). More specifically, feeling nervous had no
effect on smoking when symptoms were low; when symptoms were one group standard
deviation below an individual’s mean, the slope of nervous on smoking was not significantly
different from 0 (B = 0.30 [−0.27, 0.80]). Yet when symptoms were high, one group
standard deviation above an individual’s mean, being nervous lead to a increase in
cigarette smoking (B = 0.94 [0.44, 1.48]). This interaction is shown in Figure 2.5.
Other symptoms also interacted with depression to predict alcohol consumption
(B = 0.42, [0.08, 0.79]). When symptoms were low, depression lowered the consumption of
alcohol (B = −0.16 [−0.34, 0.02]). When symptoms were high, the effect of feeling
depressed on alcohol was not significantly different from 0 (B = 0.06 [−0.07, 0.21]). Other
symptoms did not interact with other emotions to predict health behaviors.
The results for models two and three predicting behavior from the composite
representing all symptoms are presented in Table 2.10. Neuroticism and physical symptoms
did not significantly interact to predict any of the health behaviors. Symptoms did interact
with depression to predict the healthy behaviors, exercise (B = −0.22, [−0.43,−0.01]) and
sleep (B = −0.27, [−0.44,−0.09]).
In terms of exercise, the relationship between depression and exercise was
non-significant when symptoms were low (B = 0.05 [−0.04, 0.14]). When symptoms were
high, the relationship was negative (B = −0.05 [−0.13, 0.03]). This interaction is shown in
Figure 2.5. As far as sleeping, the relationship between depression and hours of sleep was
positive when symptoms were low (B = 0.07 [−0.01, 0.15]). When symptoms were high,
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the slope was negative (B = −0.06 [−0.12, 0.01]) Interestingly, these simple slopes were
never significantly different from 0, although they were significantly different from each
other. The direction of this effect was mainly in the hypothesized direction: depression was
expected to lead to worse health behaviors, especially when a participant felt depressed in
response to a health situation. Here, when participants felt depressed after experiencing
























Relationship between nervous and smoking 























Relationship between depression and exercise 
 is moderated by all symptoms
Figure 2.5: Interaction between nervousness and other symptoms and between depression













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Overall, models 1-3 are largely consistent. Neuroticism does not appear to be a
predictor of health behaviors. This is inconsistent with the general belief that neuroticism
is predictive of poor health in part because individuals high in neuroticism are more likely
to engage in riskier behaviors. Moreover, health symptoms did not interact with
neuroticism to predict health behaviors. There is little support here that individuals high
in neuroticism may act differently when in different situations. In other words, they do not
appear to behave more or less healthy when experiencing symptoms of potential health
problems. Finally, there is little evidence that situation interacts with emotion to predict
behavior. Some models yielded results, with a total of five coefficients reaching statistical
significance. It should be noted too that in four out of the five significant interactions,
emotion predicted engaging in more unhealthy behaviors (e.g., nervousness predicted more
smoking) when health symptoms were high and that four of the five interactions involved
depression. In other words, there is evidence that different negative emotions do
differentially predict behavior, and depression – not anxiety or nervousness – appears to be
the culprit when it comes to predicting unhealthy behavior. However, the probability of
finding five or more significant coefficients with an error rate of .05 is 34.80%, and so these
significant interactions are more likely due to chance than to any true, systematic effect of
situation and emotion.
Models 1-3 did not support a pattern of neuroticism predicting behavior, even when
neuroticism interacted with situation or was broken down into its state-level parts. This
was expected. As I have proposed, neuroticism as a trait is not a predictor of behavior, nor
can a simple interaction with situation explain the variability in health behaviors.
Similarly, examining emotion devoid of the context of traits also fails to capture the
individual differences which influence behavior continuously over time, compounding and
accentuating differences in health. Instead, I believe we must model a more complex chain.
Neuroticism should predict emotions in response to situations. When there is a threat,
neuroticism should predict anxiety; otherwise, neuroticism should predict depression. These
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emotions in turn predict behaviors. The integration of these components should allow us to
examine the dependent nature of emotion and behavior on situation, as well as determine
the extent to which the effects of neuroticism on health are due to negative emotions.
2.2.3 Model 4: The integration of neuroticism, situation and
emotion to predict behavior
Finally, the proposed model (shown previously in Figure 1.3) was tested. For each
physical symptom, the interaction of neuroticism and that daily symptom was used to
predict daily emotion. A separate model was constructed to predict daily behavior. The
residuals of the model used to predict emotion were then used to predict the residuals of
the behavior model. As before, bootstrapping with 1,000 samples was employed to
estimate the coefficients of these models and their confidence intervals.
In addition to estimating pathways in this model, the direct and indirect effects of
neuroticism, symptom and their interaction were also estimated. For these estimates, a
second bootstrapping procedure was used. First, the model with neuroticism and symptom
interacting to predict behavior was run. These pathways were extracted as ‘total effects.’
Then, using the same sampled data set, a second model was estimated. This model was the
same as the first (with neuroticism, symptom and their interaction as predictors) but with
the addition of the three emotion variables as predictors. The pathways for neuroticism,
symptom and their interaction was extracted from this model as the ‘direct effects.’ To
estimate indirect effects, direct effects were subtracted from total effects. This
bootstrapping procedure was run with 1,000 iterations. Median values for direct, total and
indirect effects were used as final estimates, and the percentile method was used to extract
confidence intervals. All models control for gender, age and self-rated health. The full
results of this procedure are displayed in Appendix B. Because the symptoms were
within-person centered, the effects of neuroticism were relatively stable across the models.
For example, in the models containing head and backaches, neuroticism had a significant
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indirect effect on smoking (est = 0.21 [0.10, 0.34]) and a significant direct effect on smoking
(est = 0.37 [0.02, 0.72]). These estimates were consistent across the models, with variations
at the hundredth of a point. Neuroticism had a small direct effect on alcohol consumption
in the models with women only, i.e., with menstrual symptoms (est = 0.15 [0.06, 0.25]) and
hot flashes (est = 0.18 [0.10, 0.26]), but this may have been due to the restricted sample.
Neuroticism had no direct or indirect effect on exercise. Neuroticism had an inconsistent
indirect effect on sleep. This effect was only seen in models for dizziness, hot flashes, and
other symptoms, and was very small (est = −0.02 [−0.03, 0.00]).
The results for the model using headaches and backaches is shown in Table 2.11. The
rows for neuroticism, situation and their interaction include the coefficients from these
predictors to the emotions. The rows for the behaviors include the coefficients from the
emotions to these behaviors. As you can see, at a person’s average levels of aches,
neuroticism significantly predicted feeling greater levels of nervousness (B = 0.18
[0.16, 0.21]), depression (B = 0.18 [0.15, 0.21]), and anger (B = 0.18 [0.15, 0.21]). The
interaction between neuroticism and aches was significant, such that as participants
reported greater aches, the relationship between neuroticism and the emotions became
stronger. The first half of the theoretical model is supported by these findings: individuals
high in neuroticism respond more strongly to a negative situation (i.e., feeling aches) by
experiencing more nervousness (B = 0.03 [0.00, 0.05]), depression (B = 0.05 [0.02, 0.07])
and anger (B = 0.04 [0.01, 0.06]). The next question is whether, as a result of these
emotions, individuals high in neuroticism then act healthier. Consistent with the
hypothesis, greater anger predicted greater levels of exercise (B = 0.06 [0.00, 0.122]).
Counter to this hypothesis, as nervousness increased, so did cigarette smoking (B = 0.69
[0.29, 1.09]). Cigarette smoking also increased as depression increased (B = 0.72
[0.31, 1.10]).
This pattern of results was largely stable across all symptoms. Cold and flu symptoms




Coef Nervous Depressed Angry
Neur 0.184 [0.156, 0.211]∗ 0.182 [0.154, 0.212]∗ 0.183 [0.153, 0.210]∗
Ache -0.017 [-0.073, 0.040] -0.041 [-0.100, 0.018] -0.015 [-0.072, 0.040]
Ache x Neur 0.028 [0.003, 0.052]∗ 0.048 [0.024, 0.072]∗ 0.037 [0.013, 0.061]∗
Emotions as predictors
Nervous Depressed Angry
Cigarettes 0.690 [0.292, 1.089]∗ 0.719 [0.308, 1.097]∗ -0.300 [-0.700, 0.110]
Drinks 0.026 [-0.093, 0.154] -0.071 [-0.232, 0.095] 0.087 [-0.024, 0.197]
Sleep -0.058 [-0.118, 0.006] -0.026 [-0.121, 0.070] -0.005 [-0.065, 0.050]
Vigorous Exercise -0.056 [-0.121, 0.009] 0.003 [-0.066, 0.069] 0.061 [0.003, 0.122]∗
∗p < .05
Table 2.11: Predicting emotions and behaviors from neuroticism and ache symptoms (Model
4)
and anger (B = 0.04 [0.00, 0.07]; see Table 2.12 for a full summary of this model). Again,
the increase in negative emotions lead to an increase in negative health behaviors: more
smoking was associated with greater nervousness (B = 0.71 [0.30, 1.13]) and greater
depression (B = 0.72 [0.31, 1.16]). Greater anger was associated with more exercise
(B = 0.08 [0.01, 0.14]).
Emotions as outcomes
Coef Nervous Depressed Angry
Neur 0.183 [0.156, 0.209]∗ 0.182 [0.154, 0.21]∗ 0.182 [0.155, 0.207]∗
Cold and flu -0.063 [-0.14, 0.019] 0.029 [-0.046, 0.107] -0.034 [-0.114, 0.045]
Cold and flu x Neur 0.043 [0.008, 0.076]∗ 0.013 [-0.021, 0.044] 0.035 [0.005, 0.069]∗
Emotions as predictors
Nervous Depressed Angry
Cigarettes 0.706 [0.297, 1.126]∗ 0.718 [0.311, 1.162]∗ -0.284 [-0.645, 0.092]
Drinks 0.031 [-0.092, 0.160] -0.073 [-0.234, 0.099] 0.083 [-0.035, 0.194]
Sleep -0.055 [-0.126, 0.009] -0.029 [-0.118, 0.064] -0.003 [-0.06, 0.057]
Vigorous Exercise -0.053 [-0.122, 0.015] 0.018 [-0.051, 0.083] 0.075 [0.012, 0.136]∗
∗p < .05




Digestive issues (shown in Table 2.13) strengthened the relationship between
neuroticism and nervousness (B = 0.11 [0.06, 0.16]) and anger (B = 0.10 [0.04, 0.15]). The
resulting depression and anger again affected smoking and exercise, respectively: greater
depressed was associated with more smoking (B = 2.68 [0.95, 4.28]) and greater anger was
associated with more exercise (B = 0.07 [.01, 0.14]).
Emotions as outcomes
Coef Nervous Depressed Angry
Neur 0.179 [0.152, 0.207]∗ 0.178 [0.152, 0.203]∗ 0.178 [0.150, 0.203]∗
Digestive issues -0.192 [-0.322, -0.065]∗ 0.056 [-0.080, 0.191] -0.128 [-0.264, 0.004]
Digestive issues x Neur 0.114 [0.064, 0.163]∗ 0.030 [-0.023, 0.080] 0.095 [0.045, 0.148]∗
Emotions as predictors
Nervous Depressed Angry
Cigarettes -0.077 [-0.928, 0.861] 2.679 [0.953, 4.276]∗ -0.331 [-1.161, 0.451]
Drinks 0.030 [-0.100, 0.160] -0.068 [-0.223, 0.089] 0.086 [-0.033, 0.202]
Sleep -0.060 [-0.127, 0.005] -0.019 [-0.115, 0.07] -0.004 [-0.062, 0.047]
Vigorous Exercise -0.057 [-0.123, 0.011] 0.021 [-0.048, 0.084] 0.072 [0.007, 0.138]∗
∗p < .05
Table 2.13: Predicting emotions and behaviors from neuroticism and stomach and digestion
symptoms (Model 4)
The interaction between dizziness and neuroticism was only predictive of anger: again,
dizziness strengthened the association between the two (B = 0.10 [0.01, 0.18]). Increases in
nervousness lead to greater smoking (B = 0.69 [0.28, 1.11]) and less sleep (B = −0.08
[−0.13,−0.02]); increases in depression lead to more smoking (B = 0.75 [0.33, 1.16]).
Greater anger predicted more exercise (B = 0.07 [0.01, 0.14]). See Table 2.14 for full results.
Menstrual symptoms (shown in Table 2.15) strengthened the relationship between
neuroticism and nervousness (B = 0.08 [0.02, 0.14]) and anger (B = 0.08 [0.01, 0.14]). In
this model, only depression was predictive of smoking (B = 0.75 [0.33, 1.16]).
Hot flashes interacted with neuroticism to predict all three emotions (see Table 2.16).
Specifically, increases in hot flashes strengthened the relationship between neuroticism and




Coef Nervous Depressed Angry
Neur 0.177 [0.150, 0.205]∗ 0.177 [0.149, 0.202]∗ 0.177 [0.149, 0.205]∗
Dizziness 0.006 [-0.210, 0.245] 0.122 [-0.083, 0.338] -0.123 [-0.341, 0.089]
Dizziness x Neur 0.064 [-0.024, 0.143] 0.000 [-0.082, 0.082] 0.097 [0.014, 0.183]∗
Emotions as predictors
Nervous Depressed Angry
Cigarettes 0.687 [0.280, 1.114]∗ 0.747 [0.326, 1.162]∗ -0.298 [-0.670, 0.093]
Drinks 0.029 [-0.088, 0.160] -0.074 [-0.235, 0.095] 0.080 [-0.038, 0.199]
Sleep -0.077 [-0.131, -0.022]∗ -0.019 [-0.069, 0.039] 0.010 [-0.037, 0.057]
Vigorous Exercise -0.056 [-0.119, 0.012] 0.017 [-0.053, 0.078] 0.074 [0.010, 0.140]∗
∗p < .05
Table 2.14: Predicting emotions and behaviors from neuroticism and dizziness symptoms
(Model 4)
Emotions as outcomes
Coef Nervous Depressed Angry
Neur 0.214 [0.169, 0.262]∗ 0.242 [0.195, 0.289]∗ 0.238 [0.189, 0.286]∗
Menstrual -0.164 [-0.313, -0.003]∗ 0.037 [-0.137, 0.196] -0.135 [-0.294, 0.017]
Menstrual x Neur 0.079 [0.020, 0.141]∗ 0.003 [-0.059, 0.066] 0.08 [0.014, 0.138]∗
Emotions as predictors
Nervous Depressed Angry
Cigarettes 1.169 [-1.367, 3.43] 1.771 [0.741, 2.827]∗ -1.437 [-2.401, -0.472]∗
Drinks -0.023 [-0.142, 0.091] -0.130 [-0.264, 0.008] 0.051 [-0.064, 0.152]
Sleep -0.026 [-0.128, 0.076] -0.065 [-0.195, 0.074] -0.084 [-0.18, 0.008]
Vigorous Exercise -0.041 [-0.132, 0.047] -0.021 [-0.113, 0.07] 0.071 [-0.008, 0.150]
∗p < .05; Only women were included in these analyses. Menstrual = menstrual symptoms




[0.12, 0.34]). Similar to previous models, increases in nervousness lead to greater smoking
(B = 0.59 [0.09, 1.05]) and less sleep (B = −0.09 [−0.17,−0.01]); increases in depression
lead to more smoking (B = 0.82 [0.35, 1.33]). Hot flashes had an indirect effect on reducing
smoking (est = −0.71 [−1.74,−0.12]). The interaction of neuroticism and hot flashes had
an indirect effect on increasing smoking (est = 0.32 [0.06, 0.72]).
Emotions as outcomes
Coef Nervous Depressed Angry
Neur 0.211 [0.171, 0.250]∗ 0.223 [0.187, 0.259]∗ 0.206 [0.170, 0.242]∗
Hot Flashes -0.250 [-0.503, 0.024] -0.363 [-0.623, -0.106]∗ -0.419 [-0.671, -0.147]∗
Hot Flashes x Neur 0.131 [0.026, 0.234]∗ 0.192 [0.09, 0.3]∗ 0.234 [0.124, 0.336]∗
Emotions as predictors
Nervous Depressed Angry
Cigarettes 0.588 [0.089, 1.054]∗ 0.825 [0.346, 1.33]∗ -0.271 [-0.733, 0.181]
Drinks -0.070 [-0.165, 0.022] -0.061 [-0.161, 0.043] 0.052 [-0.032, 0.138]
Sleep -0.089 [-0.172, -0.008]∗ -0.040 [-0.158, 0.078] -0.046 [-0.126, 0.031]
Vigorous Exercise -0.031 [-0.109, 0.041] 0.025 [-0.057, 0.104] 0.060 [-0.014, 0.137]
∗p < .05; Only women were included in these analyses.
Table 2.16: Predicting emotions and behaviors from neuroticism and hot flash symptoms
(Model 4)
The interaction between neuroticism and other symptoms was predictive of all
emotions, such that other symptoms strengthened the relationship between neuroticism
and nervousness (B = 0.10 [0.03, 0.16]), depression (B = 0.08 [0.00, 0.14]), and anger
(B = 0.10 [0.03, 0.16]). Once again, greater nervousness predicted more smoking (B = 0.70
[0.31, 1.10]). Greater depression predicted more smoking (B = 0.74 [0.31, 1.13]). Greater
anger predicted more exercise (B = 0.07 [0.01, 0.14]). For full results, see Table 2.17. The
interaction of neuroticism and other symptoms had an indirect effect on increasing smoking
(est = 0.21 [0.02, 0.42]).
Finally, the composite of all symptoms interacted with neuroticism to predict all
emotions (Table 2.18). Again, as hypothesized, experiencing greater symptoms




Coef Nervous Depressed Angry
Neur 0.184 [0.156, 0.212]∗ 0.183 [0.153, 0.209]∗ 0.186 [0.157, 0.213]∗
Other Symptoms -0.094 [-0.249, 0.079] -0.083 [-0.252, 0.09] -0.110 [-0.278, 0.048]
Other Symptoms x Neur 0.099 [0.028, 0.165]∗ 0.076 [0.003, 0.145]∗ 0.096 [0.031, 0.165]∗
Emotions as predictors
Nervous Depressed Angry
Cigarettes 0.696 [0.307, 1.105]∗ 0.742 [0.306, 1.130]∗ -0.276 [-0.674, 0.085]
Drinks 0.038 [-0.097, 0.163] -0.071 [-0.232, 0.084] 0.07 [-0.044, 0.192]
Sleep -0.061 [-0.127, 0.003] -0.019 [-0.114, 0.07] -0.006 [-0.066, 0.049]
Vigorous Exercise -0.057 [-0.120, 0.011] 0.014 [-0.058, 0.082] 0.072 [0.013, 0.135]∗
∗p < .05
Table 2.17: Predicting emotions and behaviors from neuroticism and other symptoms (Model
4)
depression (B = 0.11 [0.03, 0.20]), and anger (B = 0.26 [0.18, 0.34]). Again, counter to the
hypotheses, smoking was positively associated with increases in nervousness (B = 0.68
[0.28, 1.08]) and depression (B = 0.71 [0.32, 1.13]). Nervousness predicted less exercise
(B = −0.06 [−0.13, 0.30]).
Emotions as outcomes
Coef Nervous Depressed Angry
Neur 0.182 [0.154, 0.210]∗ 0.183 [0.155, 0.212]∗ 0.181 [0.155, 0.209]∗
All Symptoms -0.235 [-0.45, -0.031]∗ 0.085 [-0.115, 0.298] -0.311 [-0.504, -0.105]∗
All Symptoms x Neur 0.21 [0.120, 0.302]∗ 0.114 [0.029, 0.202]∗ 0.258 [0.176, 0.342]∗
Emotions as predictors
Nervous Depressed Angry
Cigarettes 0.680 [0.275, 1.085]∗ 0.714 [0.32, 1.126]∗ -0.314 [-0.68, 0.086]
Drinks 0.033 [-0.100, 0.171] -0.075 [-0.234, 0.09] 0.09 [-0.028, 0.203]
Sleep -0.059 [-0.129, 0.004] -0.025 [-0.128, 0.073] -0.007 [-0.066, 0.054]
Vigorous Exercise -0.062 [-0.126, -0.001]∗ -0.003 [-0.069, 0.062] 0.06 [-0.001, 0.118]
∗p < .05
Table 2.18: Predicting emotions and behaviors from neuroticism and all symptoms (Model
4)
The results of model 4 using the all symptoms composite is shown in Figure 2.6. Only
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significant pathways are shown. As you can see, neuroticism predicted greater anxiety,
depression and nervousness. These pathways are significantly moderated by situation.
However, only nervousness and depression predict smoking, in the direction of more
unhealthy behavior, and no emotion predicts any of the other behaviors. As a reminder,
the pathways from neuroticism, situation and their interaction are estimated in model 2.






















Figure 2.6: The results of model 4 using all symptoms as the situation.
Overall, the first half of the model was confirmed. In all cases, neuroticism predicted
greater nervousness, depression and anger when individuals experienced average levels of
symptoms. Increased symptoms tended to strengthen the relationship between neuroticism
and emotion. However, the second half of the model – the relationship from those increased
emotions to behavior – was not as hypothesized. Specifically, increases in anxiety,
depression and anger tended to lead to increases in smoking, not decreases. In some cases,
greater nervousness lead to less sleep. To conclude, while the hypothesized pathways from
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neuroticism and situation to emotion were supported, the link between emotion and
behavior was not. It does not appear that this model accounts for different effects of
neuroticism on health behaviors, nor does it explain the pathways through which
neuroticism may influence health.
However, it is possible this model accounts for the effects of neuroticism in other
domains. What follows is a test of all four models, with a focus on model 4, in the
educational domain. It is possible that the effects of neuroticism and emotion on
educational behaviors may differ, for several reasons. First, adults have fairly
well-established health behaviors, whereas students, especially first-semester freshmen, may
be more focused on changing behaviors. Second, it is likely that not all adults value their
health or make their health a major goal. Students at a prestigious university almost
uniformly value success in educational settings, as this is one of the criteria by which they
are admitted to the school. For these reasons, we may find that the effects of neuroticism
and emotion on educational behaviors, such as studying or skipping class, may be larger
and therefore easier to detect.
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3. Study 2: Academic Behaviors
3.1 Study 2 Methods
3.1.1 Participants
Participants were freshman students taking a seminar in psychology either in 2015 or
2016. As part of this course, students completed a weekly survey which included questions
about their recent emotions, academic behaviors and performance in the classroom.
Students were asked if their data could be used for research puposes. Of the 296 students
in the course, 222 provided consent and completed the personality questionnaire. These
222 students are included in these analyses. These students completed between 6 and 14
weekly reports, for a total of 2,870 reports.
3.1.2 Measures
Neuroticism
Approximately mid-way through the semester, students completed the NEO-FFI
(Costa Jr. and McCrae, 1992), a 60-item measure of personality. This included 12 items
assessing neuroticism including items like “I feel inferior to others,” and “I rarely feel
lonely or blue.” Students rated these items on a scale from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 5
(Strongly Agree). Responses were averaged to create a single trait scale for each participant
(M = 3.04, SD = 0.70). This scale showed good reliability in this sample (α = 0.86).
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Neuroticism was grand-mean centered for the analyses, allowing for easier interpretation of
results.
Situation: Academic feedback
Each week, students were asked to think about the most significant exam or
assignment they had received back (i.e., for which they had found out the grade they had
received) that week. There were a total of 1,158 of grades received. Whether or not a
student received feedback is one way that situations will be operationalized. Students were
asked to report what kind of assignment was returned. Students reported that 29.58 % of
the grades were on midterm exams, 10.28 % of the grades were on essays, 2.54 % were on
quizzes, and 2.16 % were on assignments, such as lab reports and homeworks. The rest
were unreported.
Students were asked to report the grade they received, which is the second way that
siutations will be operationalized. Some students provided a letter grade, some provided a
percentage and some provided a fraction of the number of points the received over the
total. The numeric grade was transformed to be the percentage correct multipled by 100.
Both the letter grade and the numeric grade will be used in the analyses. In addition, some
students provided details regrading curving grades, when relevant. Finally, students were
asked to report how they felt about their grade on a scale from 1 (very negative) to 5 (very
positive; M = 3.39, SD = 1.52). This will be the third way situations will be
operaionalized.
To measure these grades on the same scale, each student was assigned both a numeric
grade and a letter grade. If they did not directly report a numeric grade, they were
assigned the value of the smallest percentage needed to receive that grade. For example, if
a student reported receiving a B on an assignment, they were assigned the numeric grade
83. (Figure 3.2 shows the distribution of these grades.) If a student reported receiving an




























Figure 3.2: Distribution of numeric grades
student indicated that the grade was curved and provided both their percentage and their
letter grade, the letter grade was used to assign their numeric grade. For example, if a
student reported that they received 66% on an exam, but after the curve was awarded a
C+, their numeric grade was assigned as 77%.
Some students (n = 117) either reported no grade or reported that they were
uncomfortable providing their grade. The latter students are of great value to the study, as
the goal is to examine behavior after receiving a poor grade. Instead of removing these
reports, grades for these students were estimated by taking the average numeric grade
reported for students receiving feedback on the same assignment (e.g. exam or paper) and
feeling the same way about their grade (i.e., 1-5). Appendix C includes specific details on
the values assigned as numeric and letter grades in various situations.
The given numeric grade variable was centered at 85 for ease of interpreation. This
value was chosen to represent an “average” grade in the sense of what average performance
in a class might be. (This is instead of choosing the average of the sample, which is likely
very high, or within-person centering, which would remove the natural comparison students


































Figure 3.4: Relationship between numeric
grade and sadness
professors and friends.) Simple two-level hierarchical models (week nested within student)
were run to examine the relationship between letter grade and emotion, with no covariates.
These models demonstrated evidence of both linear and quadratic effects (see Figures 3.3
and 3.4). Quadratic effects of number grade were tested in all the models; however, the
coefficient estimates for the squared terms and their interactions were too small1 and so
were excluded from this thesis for brevity.
Emotion
Each week, students completed a survey which included questions about their moods
and activities of the past week. For these analyses, two items assessing emotion will be
used. The first item asked students to indicate how much of the time in the past week they
had felt anxious on a scale from 0 (Not at all) to 6 (Very much; M = 2.97, SD = 1.69).
The second item asked students to indicate how much of the time they had felt sad, on the
same scale (M = 2.34, SD = 1.56). There were no items that assessed anger in this data





Each week, students were asked about the extent to which they engaged in a number
of academic behaviors. Students reported the average number of hours each day they spent
studying for class (including reading assigments, homework, preparing for exams, writing
papers, and working on course-related projects; M = 3.98, SD = 2.23) . Students also
reported the number of hours they spent on social media (M = 1.88, SD = 1.30). Students
reported how many times in the past week they skipped a class (M = 0.73, SD = 1.25) and
the number of times they visited a professor outside of class (M = 0.46, SD = 0.81).
Prediction time frames
The use of academic behaviors in conjuction with feedback on academic work provided
some unique challenges. First, the use of weeks as the time frame makes it difficult to
assess causality. Are students studying because they are sad or, as a friend interpreted my
results, are they sad because they are studying? While true causality cannot be established
with these data, problems of concurrency can be eliminated by using emotion and feedback
in one week to predict behavior in the next. This was done in the majority of the analyses.
Second, students are expected to change their behavior partly in response to feedback
(otherwise, this study would not exist), but these changes may only be seen in certain
circumstances. More specifically, I expect students who receive poor grades to study more
but only as they approach another exam or assignment. Consequently, when analyzing the
relationship between specific feedback (i.e., letter grade, numeric grade or perception of
grade) and hours of studying, I predicted studying behavior not in the following week, but
in the next week in which a student had an assignment, exam or paper. This does limit
power - it is likely that some students will have one fewer time point available for analyses





A three-level hierarchical linear modeling will be used to test the theoretical model.
Level one will be the prediction of a rating from the emotion category (see Equation 3.1).
One dummy code will be incorporated to indicate which emotion is the outcome. This
coefficients will represent the average differences in ratings of nervousness (anxiety), and
sadness. Next, emotion will be nested within weeks (Level 2). At this level, the emotion
coefficients will be predicted by the academic feedback variable. Only the intercept (i.e.,
the mean rating of anxiety) will be allowed to vary across days (see Equation 3.2).
Academic feedback will be examined in two different ways. First, a binary variable
representing whether the student received feedback at all will be used to predict emotion.
Second, the continuous numeric variable of the percentage of points their earned on the
assignment (obtained from the direct report when possible or from the minimum grade
needed if the letter grade was reported). The effects of these two variables will be modeled
separately. Weeks will be nested within person (Level 3). At this level, neuroticism will be
used to predict all coefficients: intercepts, mean levels of anxiety, the difference between
anxiety and sadness and the interaction between each of the emotions and feedback. All
coefficients will be allowed to vary at this level (see Equation 3.5).
Level 1: Emotion level
Ratingijk = pi0jk + pi1jk(IsSadijk) + eijk
(3.1)
Level 2: Week level
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pi0jk = β00k + β01k(AcademicFeedbackjk) + r0jk
pi1jk = β10k + β11k(AcademicFeedbackjk)
(3.2)
Level 3: Person level
β00k = γ000 + γ001(Neuroticismk) + µ00k
β01k = γ010 + γ011(Neuroticismk) + µ01k
β10k = γ100 + γ101(Neuroticismk)
β11k = γ110 + γ111(Neuroticismk)
(3.3)
This model will be run twice, once with each of the emotions as the reference group,
to estimate the pathways from neuroticism and situation to each of the emotions.
Additional models will be run predicting each of the four academic behaviors. These
will be two-level models, with week nested within participant. An example of the hours
spent studying model is described below.
Level 1: Week level
Studyingjk = β0k + β1k(AcademicFeedbackjk) + rjk
(3.4)
Level 2: Person level
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β0k = γ000 + γ001(Neuroticismk) + µ0k
β1k = γ100 + γ101(Neuroticismk) + µ1k
(3.5)
The same procedure described in Study 1 will be used here to estimate the paths from
emotion to academic behavior. Using the models to predict emotion and behavior,
predicted scores for each person will be calculated using the fixed effects coefficients of
these models. These predictions will be subtracted from observed scores to generate
residuals, which will be used in the model predicting behavior from emotion. In other
words, the residuals of the emotion variables will constitute the independent variables and
the residuals of behavior will be the dependent variables. This model is described in
equations 2.12 and 2.13.
Level 1: Week Level
Behaviorij = β0j + β1j(Anxiousij) + β2j(Sadij) + eij
(3.6)
Level 2: Person Level
β0j = γ00 + µ0j
β1j = γ10 + µ1j




This entire model estimate procedure will be used to estimate the models with each of
the situations or academic feedback variables (whether or not feedback was received and
the numeric grade) leading to each of the academic behaviors (hours studying, on social
media, times visited the professor and times skipped class) through the emotions, resulting
in a total of 8 models.
3.1.4 Hypotheses
It is hypothesized that individuals high in neuroticism will experience higher levels of
each emotion overall. That is, the mean level of anxiety and sadness should increase as
participants increase in trait neuroticism. Receiving feedback and receiving poorer grades
are both expected to increase experiences of anxiety and decrease experiences of sadness.
Finally, greater anxiety in the face of feedback is hypothesized to increase participation in
adaptive behaviors (studying and visiting the professor) and decrease participation in
maladaptive behaviors (using social media and skipping class). Greater levels of sadness
are hypothesized to have the opposite effect on academic behaviors.
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3.2 Study 2 Results
As in Study 1, correlations were calculated using different values based on the variable
type. For correlations between two person-level variables and correlations between two
week-level variables, the raw scores were used, with pairwise deletion. For correlations
between one person-level variable and one week-level variable, the correlation was between
the raw person-level score and the student’s average of the week-level variable. All
correlations can be found in Table 3.1.
Neuroticism was positively associated with feeling more anxious (r = 0.58) and feeling
more sad (r = 0.59). Neuroticism was associated with receiving worse grades (measured by
percent correct; r = −0.09) and feeling worse about grades (r = −0.13). This was despite
the positive association between neuroticism and studying more hours (r = 0.08) and
possibly related to the associations between neuroticism and spending more time on social
media (r = 0.12), skipping class more often (r = 0.08) and visiting professors outside of
class less often (r = −0.14).
Feeling anxious was associated with feeling worse about grades (r = −0.08) but not
receiving worse grades (r = −0.05). Anxiety in one week was associated with studying
more the following week (r = 0.07) but not with hours on social media (r = 0.03), skipping
class (r = −0.01) or visiting the professor (r = 0.03).
Feeling sad was associated with receiving a poor grade (r = −0.08) and feeling poorly
about grades (r = −0.11). Feeling sad one week was associated with spending more time on
social media (r = 0.05) and skipping class (r = 0.06) the following week but was unrelated







































































































































































































































































































































































3.2.1 Model 1: Neuroticism predicting behavior
The first model tested the effect of neuroticism on behavior, controlling for gender.2
This effect was estimated using multilevel models with weeks nested within person.
Neuroticism was grand-mean centered; as a result, intercepts can be interpreted as
sample-level means. Intercepts were allowed to vary across participant, and so the
neuroticism coefficient can be interpreted as the extent to which neuroticism increases or
decreases a participant’s average level of the behavior compared to the sample average.
Bootstrapping with 1,000 iterations was used to estimate the 95% confidence intervals. Full
results can be found in Table 3.2.
Academic Behaviors
Hours studying Hours on social media Number times skipped class Number times visit professor
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept 3.06∗ 1.39∗ 1.30∗ 0.67∗
(2.01,4.02) (0.71,2.08) (0.84,1.78) (0.35,1.02)
Neuroticism 0.12 0.12 0.15 -0.10
(-0.25,0.50) (-0.12,0.35) (-0.02,0.32) (-0.22,0.02)
Gender 0.59∗ 0.27 -0.33∗ -0.12
(0.07,1.18) (-0.11,0.65) (-0.59,-0.08) (-0.32,0.06)
Students 211 211 211 211
Observations 2,432 2,433 2,403 2,398
Note: ∗p < .05
Table 3.2: Predicting academic behaviors from trait neuroticism (Model 1)
Neuroticism was a weak predictor of academic behaviors. Neuroticism did not predict
the number of hours students spent studying (B = 0.12, 95% CI = [−0.25, 0.50]), the
number of hours spent on social media (B = 0.12, [−0.12, 0.35]), visiting a professor
outside of class (B = −0.10, [−0.22, 0.02]) or the number of times students skipped class
(B = 0.15, [−0.02, 0.32]).
2As a reminder, the sample consists of freshman undergraduates, meaning there was little variability in
age. Consequently, I did not control for age in this study.
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3.2.2 Models 2 and 3: The interaction of neuroticism or emotion
and situation in predicting behavior
Next, models two and three were estimated. In model two, situation (i.e., academic
feedback) was introduced as a covariate and the interaction between situation and
neuroticism was included. In model three, weekly emotions – anxiety and sadness – and
situation were main effects and the interactions of situation with each of the emotions were
included. All models controlled for gender.
For the first set of models, academic feedback was a binary variable representing
whether feedback was received that week or not (see Table 3.3 for results). All behaviors
were assessed the following week. Feedback did not interact with neuroticism to predict
hours studied (B = −0.01, [−0.11, 0.08]), hours on social media (B = −0.01, [−0.11, 0.08]),
skipping class (B = −0.04, [−0.16, 0.09]), or visiting the professor (B = −0.03,
[−0.12, 0.05]). Feedback did not interact with feeling anxious or sad to predict any
academic behaviors.
Next, letter grade was used to operationalize academic feedback. As a reminder,
dummy codes representing grades B, C, D and E/F were used. In the tables presented, the
intercept is renamed “Grade A” for clarity. In addition, while letter grade in one week was
used to predict time spent on social media, skipping class and visiting the professor the
following week, hours spent studying was predicted in the next week which included a test
or exam. Full results can be found in Table 3.4. Letter grade did not interact with
neuroticism to predict any of the academic behaviors and did not interact with anxiety or
sadness, with one exception. The relationship between anxiety and visiting a professor was
negative for students who received a C but positive for students who received an A. This
interaction is depicted in Figure 3.5.
Numeric grade was also used to operationalize academic feedback. Again, hours spent
studying was predicted in the next week which included a test or exam. Full results can be


























Figure 3.5: Relationship between anxiety, letter grade and visiting professors in model 3.
predict behavior.
Finally, student perception of the grade was used to predict academic behavior.
Students’ feelings about their grade did not interact with neuroticism, anxiety or sadness














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3.2.3 Model 4: The integration of neuroticism, situation and
emotion to predict behavior
Finally, the proposed model (shown in Figure 1.3) was tested. For each form of
academic feedback, the interaction of neuroticism and that form of feedback was used to
predict emotion and separately used to predict behavior. The residuals of the emotion
model were then used to predict the residuals of the behavior model, allowing for the
estimation of the mediation pathway. Bootstrapping with 1,000 samples was used to
estimate the coefficients and their confidence intervals. Neuroticism was grand-mean
centered, allowing for easier interpretation.
Direct and indirect effects of neuroticism, feedback and their interaction were also
estimated. The same bootstrapping procedure that was used in Study 1 to estimate direct
and indirect effects was used here. First, I ran a model with the interaction of neuroticism
and feedback predicting behavior. These pathways were extracted as ‘total effects.’ Then,
using the same sampled data set, I ran a model with neuroticism, symptom and their
interaction as predictors, and with the addition of the three emotion variables as predictors.
The pathways for neuroticism, feedback and their interaction was extracted from this
model as the ‘direct effects.’ To estimate indirect effects, direct effects were subtracted
from total effects. This bootstrapping procedure was run with 1,000 iterations. Median
values for direct, total and indirect effects were used as final estimates, and the percentile
method was used to extract confidence intervals. All models control for gender. Results for
neuroticism were largely consistent – there were no indirect effects of neuroticism on
behavior through emotion, no were there any indirect effects of feedback or the interaction
of feedback and neuroticism. There were some direct effects - neuroticism had a significant
direct effect on most behaviors in most models. Other effects were sparse and will not be
discussed in this chapter. Interested reviewers can see all the results in Appendix D.
The results for the model using feedback – a binary variable representing whether a
student received feedback that week or not – is presented in Table 3.7 and displayed
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graphically in Figure 3.6. When students did not receive feedback, neuroticism was a
significant predictor of anxiety (B = 0.84 [0.66, 1.02]) and sadness (B = 0.69 [0.49, 0.88]).
However, feedback and neuroticism did not interact to predict anxiety (B = 0.15
[−0.03, 0.32]) or sadness (B = 0.16 [−0.01, 0.33]), which would have been expected had
students high in neuroticism reacted more strongly to events. Students who felt more
anxious visited the professor outside of class more (B = 0.03 [0.01, 0.05]). Students who
felt more sad also visited the professor outside of class more (B = 0.07 [0.01, 0.13]) and
studied more the following week (B = 0.06 [0.01, 0.13]).
Emotions as outcomes
Coef Anxious Sad
Neur 0.835 [0.657, 1.022]∗ 0.692 [0.494, 0.877]∗
Received feedback 0.070 [-0.053, 0.192] -0.010 [-0.136, 0.105]
Received feedback x Neur 0.152 [-0.026, 0.325] 0.163 [-0.009, 0.328]
Emotions as predictors
Anxious Sad
Hours studying -0.006 [-0.065, 0.045] 0.065 [0.010, 0.128]∗
Hours on social media -0.007 [-0.033, 0.019] -0.008 [-0.036, 0.018]
Number times skipped class -0.004 [-0.040, 0.030] 0.022 [-0.013, 0.061]
Number of times visit professor 0.027 [0.007, 0.047]∗ -0.028 [-0.05, -0.007]∗
∗p < .05
Table 3.7: Predicting emotions and behaviors from neuroticism and Feedback (Model 4)
The results for the letter grade model are shown in Table 3.8. When students received
A’s, neuroticism significantly predicted greater anxiety (B = 1.05 [0.78, 1.29]) and greater
sadness (B = 0.82 [0.55, 1.08]). At average levels of neuroticism, students who received C
grades were more anxious (B = 0.33 [0.08, 0.61]) and sadder than students who received A
grades (B = 0.32 [0.04, 0.58]) and students who received D grades were also sadder than
students who received A grades (B = 0.46 [0.10, 0.83]). Grades did not interact with
neuroticism to predict emotion. Moreover, emotion did not predict any of the academic
behaviors.





Grade A -0.361 [-0.961, 0.181] -0.401 [-0.968, 0.176]
Grade B vs A 0.152 [-0.033, 0.341] 0.011 [-0.175, 0.216]
Grade C vs A 0.332 [0.080, 0.607]∗ 0.315 [0.041, 0.576]∗
Grade D/F vs A 0.268 [-0.075, 0.614] 0.459 [0.101, 0.831]∗
Neur 1.050 [0.784, 1.294]∗ 0.823 [0.552, 1.084]∗
Grade B x Neur -0.134 [-0.423, 0.173] 0.001 [-0.285, 0.290]
Neur x Grade C -0.324 [-0.701, 0.045] -0.011 [-0.397, 0.365]
Neur x Grade DF 0.040 [-0.519, 0.545] -0.292 [-0.815, 0.211]
Emotions as predictors
Anxious Sad
Hours studying 0.030 [-0.047, 0.109] -0.034 [-0.118, 0.05]
Hours on social media 0.022 [-0.044, 0.091] 0.002 [-0.07, 0.084]
Number times skipped class -0.018 [-0.091, 0.057] 0.026 [-0.031, 0.082]
Number of times visit professor 0.018 [-0.016, 0.053] -0.032 [-0.093, 0.036]
∗p < .05
Table 3.8: Predicting emotions and behaviors from neuroticism and Feedback (Model 4)
centered at 85, which may be considered an “average” score on an exam or essay (in the
sense of professor expectations, not actual class performance). When students received
average grades, neuroticism significantly predicted greater anxiety (B = 0.96 [0.75, 1.17])
and greater sadness (B = 0.82 [0.60, 1.03]). At average levels of neuroticism, better grades
predicted less anxiety (B = −0.01 [−0.02, 0.00]) and less sadness (B = −0.01 [−0.02, 0.00]).
However, the interaction between grade and neuroticism did not predict emotion, and
emotions did not predict academic behaviors,
Finally, the results for the “feelings about grade” model are shown in Table 3.10.
Feelings are grand-mean centered. When students felt average about their grades,
neuroticism significantly predicted greater anxiety (B = 1.00 [0.79, 1.18]) and greater
sadness (B = 0.85 [0.65, 1.06]). In addition, as students felt more positively about their
grades, they felt less anxiety (B = −0.08 [−0.13,−0.02]) and less sadness (B = −0.09
[−0.15,−0.04]). The interaction of feelings and neuroticism did not predict emotion;





Neur 0.962 [0.752, 1.171]∗ 0.82 [0.601, 1.035]∗
Numeric Grade -0.009 [-0.016, -0.001]∗ -0.012 [-0.019, -0.005]∗
Numeric Grade x Neur 0.003 [-0.007, 0.013] 0.005 [-0.005, 0.015]
Emotions as predictors
Anxious Sad
Hours studying 0.023 [-0.059, 0.100] -0.039 [-0.121, 0.045]
Hours on social media 0.021 [-0.050, 0.084] 0.008 [-0.068, 0.085]
Number times skipped class -0.015 [-0.089, 0.060] 0.017 [-0.046, 0.078]
Number of times visit professor 0.021 [-0.013, 0.055] -0.038 [-0.105, 0.027]
∗p < .05




Neur 0.996 [0.794, 1.177]∗ 0.847 [0.650, 1.060]∗
Feel about grade -0.075 [-0.132, -0.018]∗ -0.092 [-0.151, -0.038]∗
Feel about grade x Neur 0.052 [-0.035, 0.133] 0.028 [-0.058, 0.109]
Emotions as predictors
Anxious Sad
Hours studying -0.016 [-0.094, 0.071] -0.013 [-0.092, 0.071]
Hours on social media 0.013 [-0.054, 0.078] 0.054 [-0.02, 0.131]
Number times skipped class -0.031 [-0.103, 0.042] 0.035 [-0.022, 0.096]
Number of times visit professor 0.017 [-0.023, 0.057] -0.034 [-0.076, 0.011]
∗p < .05
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Figure 3.6: The results of model 4 using all symptoms as the situation.
Overall, there was little evidence that neuroticism predicted academic behaviors or
interacted with academic feedback to predict academic behaviors. Furthermore, academic
feedback did not interact with week-level emotions to predict behavior. Finally, there was
little support for the proposed theoretical model (Figure 1.3). Specficially, situation did
not moderate the effect of neuroticism when situation was operationalized as numeric
grade, letter grade or perception of grade. In these models, week-level emotions did not
predict behaviors. However, when situation was operationalized as receiving any feedback,
feedback predicted emotion and emotion predicted hours studying and visiting the
professor. This suggests that any kind of feedback - positive or negative - can elicit anxiety
or sadness and in turn influence behavior.
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4. Discussion
Overall, these studies lend little support for the proposed theory of healthy
neuroticism. The primary model of interest – the interaction of neuroticism and situation
on behavior is mediated by increases in anxiety and decreases in depression and anger -
was not supported. Specifically, in the education domain, only the model which used
receiving feedback as the situation and studying as the outcome yielded estimates
consistent with the hypotheses. In the health domain, not only did none of the models
yield coefficients in support of the hypotheses, but several models provided counter
support, as increases in nervousness predicted less healthy behavior, not more healthy.
Additional analyses (models 2 and 3) yielded little support for other proposed
manifestations of healthy neuroticism. It does not appear that situation moderates the
effect of neuroticism on behavior, nor does it moderate the specific negative emotions that
are under the broader umbrella of neuroticism. And without the moderation, neuroticism
and the specific emotions had null or negligible effects on behavior, which itself suggests
that current focus on the maladaptiveness of neuroticism as a trait may be exaggerated.
4.1 Issues muddying the water
These analyses suggest that not only might the theory of healthy neuroticism be
unfounded, but the whole assumption that neuroticism results in worse behaviors and
outcomes may be overblown. Lest we throw the signal out with the noise, we must consider
86
Issues muddying the water
the limitations of the current studies and the degree to which they can mask real results.
First, there is the issue of measurement of neuroticism in the health study. The scale
used, the MIDI personality scales (Lachman and Weaver, 1997), are included in a number
of large panel studies and have been used to successfully investigate the relationship
between traits and health outcomes many times (e.g., Goodwin and Friedman, 2006;
Mroczek and Almeida, 2004; Turiano et al., 2013, 2012; Weston et al., 2015; Weston and
Jackson, 2014). However, many acknowledge that this scale is limited. With only four
items, the specificity of the scale is restricted, as is the range of possible trait scores. The
items used - “worrying,” “nervous,” “calm (R),” and “moody”’ - capture a sense of anxiety
but not depression or anger, let alone other negative emotions or general emotional
instability (Goldberg, 1993). And while this rough measure may be sufficient to estimate
broad outcomes, like mortality, disease onset and even patterns of behavior, it does seem
insufficient to predict behaviors at such a level of specificity as the day. This alone may
have hindered the ability to capture the relationship between neuroticism and daily health
behaviors.
Second, not only was the measurement of neuroticism in the health study too coarse,
but the time frame used to measure emotion was too broad. As a reminder, the health
study asked participants to report their emotion over the last 24 hours, while the education
study asked for emotion over the past week. Both of these methods are retrospective and
ask participants to aggregate emotion over a period of time. Retrospective reports of
emotion can be clouded by memory biases or defensive mechanisms (Barrett, 1997).
Moreover, aggregating across multiple instances of emotion can obscure more fine-grained
emotions (Levenson, 2014). Emotion researchers are more prone to debate the merits of
assessing emotion by the second versus the millisecond (Mauss et al., 2005) rather than by
the day or week. In the present studies, it is impossible to tell whether the emotions
assessed are in response to the situations experienced, as we cannot know how long after
the event a participant experienced an emotion, or even whether participants experienced
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the emotion after the situation. Similarly, it is impossible to know in most of these models
whether the emotion preceded the behavior (let alone caused it). Future research should
consider the use of more frequent assessments of emotion. Even better, health researchers
should seek opportunities to measure emotional responses to specific events. Patients with
chronic and serious illnesses often seek psychological counseling in addition to medical
treatments. During counseling, patients already report their emotions to diagnoses,
treatment options, changes in health, etc., throughout the process of addressing health
concerns. Those patients willing to share their experience with researchers can provide
real-world data on how health situations can influence emotion and behavior.
This brings us to the third measurement issue that may obscure our ability to see
relationships between neuroticism and adaptive behaviors: situations. As mentioned above,
there is no doubt that serious health situations, like being diagnosed with cancer, elicit
strong negative behaviors in patients, and similarly, there is no doubt that patients will
change their behavior in response to such a situation. Can the same be said for health
symptoms, like a stomach ache or dizziness? It seems unlikely. The health situations
chosen in the current study may not have been strong enough to elicit a behavioral
response, especially for some of the behaviors chosen. For example, a regular smoker is not
going to skip cigarettes for a day because of a back ache. If these results are any indication,
that person will smoke more, perhaps as a distraction or a comfort. These minor or daily
health situations may not be strong enough to elicit new behaviors. In that vein, a recent
study on predictors of daily behavior found that while personality and situation both
predicted behavior, they did so independently (Sherman et al., 2015). Specifically,
personality traits and situational characteristics, as measured by the DIAMONDS model
(Rauthmann et al., 2014), predict state expressions (i.e., the extent to which a
participant’s momentary behavior, feelings or thoughts were pertaining to one of ten
personality constructs). But the extent to which a trait was related to state expressions did
not depend on the situation at hand. While the daily behavior study did not measure
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specific health situations, the symptoms used in the current study may be the type of daily
situation described by the DIAMONDS model. That is, while health symptoms may
directly impact behavior, they do not do so through changing the existing relationship
between trait neuroticism and health behaviors.
4.2 Implications for personality and health
As described above, there were certainly methodological choices made which may have
prevented us from finding the expected results. However, let’s assume for a moment that
these choices did not, in fact, inhibit the study. Certainly between the use of large (in the
case of the health study) and sufficient (in the case of the education study) sample sizes,
each with many repeated measures, there is enough power to overcome some problems of
low reliability or broadness in our measures. If these results are to be believed,1 then the
implication for personality and health researchers is clear: pay less attention to neuroticism.
Think back to the initial problem which precipitated the need for a theory of healthy
neuroticism. The association between neuroticism and health, especially mortality,
appeared to jump around from large panel study to large panel study. In some cases,
neuroticism predicted greater mortality, but in some cases, predicted greater longevity.
Results were often taken at face value, because the sample sizes were substantial enough to
warrant that these studies be taken seriously. But even large studies are subject to chance,
especially when the true population results are small. The current study, along with a long
literature of neuroticism and health, suggest that the effect of neuroticism on health is
likely extremely small, and sample variation has resulted in some positive, some negative
and some null results. Rather than being of “public health significance” (Lahey, 2009),
neuroticism may just be a nuisance.
The drive to fit neuroticism into a literature of health is (reasonably) founded on the
relationship of neuroticism to stress and the knowledge that chronic stress has severe
1Personally, I believe them.
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implications for physical health (Cohen and Wills, 1985). If neuroticism is related to
experiencing chronic stress (which it is), and chronic stress is related to worse health
(which it is), then there’s every reason to predict neuroticism is related to worse health.
However, the mathematics get in the way. The link from neuroticism to health in this
chain is composed of two parts: the neuroticism to stress part and the stress to health part.
That link from neuroticism to health is calculated by multiplying each pathway along the
chain together. Assume for a moment that the link between stress and health is large,
perhaps as large as r = −.50.2 Neuroticism is the tendency to experience stress, which is
not the same as experiencing chronic stress. So the path from neuroticism to chronic stress
is expected to be tiny. Significant, but tiny, perhaps no larger than r = .10. Meaning the
pathway personality and health researchers search for - the link from neuroticism to
mortality, or disease onset, or behavior - is even smaller. Given our generous hypothetical
estimates, the direct correlation from neuroticism to health is r = −.05. And remember,
this is our population effect, which means sample estimates will bounce around this
number... much like they do in the literature. Which brings us back to the point above. It
seems almost certain that neuroticism has a negative relationship to health. It’s just not a
large enough relationship to reliably detect. This is especially problematic given that other
personality traits are more directly related to health, like conscientiousness or extraversion.
These relationships are easier for us to identify, and thus to change or intervene on. If the
goal is to improve health, either by encouraging new behaviors or identifying at-risk
patients in health care settings, our time will be more efficiently spent turning away from
neuroticism and turning towards other traits.
2While this relationship is consistently found in the literature, the effect size depends substantially on
the measurement of stress and of health (Cohen and Wills, 1985). Consequently, it is difficult to find a
specific number to put here.
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4.3 Future directions for neuroticism and health
I should clarify: I do not mean to say neuroticism is not worth studying in relation to
health. Instead, it seems likely that current conceptions of neuroticism are inefficient.
Measuring neuroticism at the trait level and expecting those estimates to be associated
with behavior or narrow health outcomes is unreasonable, especially given the specific
mechanisms by which we expect neuroticism to impact health. Certainly many would
advocate for the use of facets or even items of neuroticism as predictors (e.g., Vainik et al.,
2015). But there are other narrow personality constructs which merit consideration.
One such construct is body vigilance, sometimes called body awareness. There has yet
to be a consistent definition of body vigilance among researchers, although we may think of
this construct as containing several parts: proprioception the perceptions of joint angles
and muscle tension;, interoception, the processing of sensory input from inside the body,
specifically around the organs and tissues; and mindfulness, which is the extent to which a
person is deliberate about scanning their body for sensations (Mehling et al., 2009). The
concept of body vigilance has been woven into the theory of healthy neuroticism from its
very beginning. In his first paper on the subject, Friedman (2000) wrote, “Consider now a
classic Woody Allen type neuroticism, however, which leads one to be very vigilant about
germs, symptoms needing attention, medical developments, and cooperation with
treatment. Such a (health nut) neurotic might remain very healthy” (p. 1102, emphasis
mine). The term “vigilance” then appears in a number writings about healthy neuroticism
(e.g., Hampson, 2012; Hill and Roberts, 2016; Mroczek et al., 2009; Murray and Booth,
2015; Smith et al., 2004; Weston and Jackson, 2014). But vigilance is never measured by
personality researchers.
Which is not to say that measures of vigilance do not exist. In fact, the first challenge
of neuroticism researchers who wish to measure vigilance will be deciding the best (set of)
measure(s) to use. One review found twelve self-report measures of body vigilance
(Mehling et al., 2009). Importantly, body vigilance appears to be associated with the
91
Future directions for neuroticism and health
major constructs in the healthy neurotic theory. Vigilance is related to health, although
the direction is unclear. One measure is negatively associated with health, including
increased clinic visits, longitudinal decreases in SRH and cross-sectional illness (Hansell
and Sherman, 1991). Another measure interacted with physical impairment in
hemodialysis patients to predict medication adherence (Christensen et al., 1996). Vigilance
is related to higher trait anxiety (Schmidt and Lerew, 1997) and even trait neuroticism
(Lombardo et al., 2007). In fact the relationship between neuroticism and pain vigilance, a
specific kind of body vigilance, is mediated by pain catastrophizing and fear of movement
(Goubert et al., 2004) in a sample of patients with non-specific chronic or recurrent back
pain. This suggests that neuroticism may be related to general body vigilance through
general anxiety or fear, which maps perfectly onto our conception of healthy neuroticism.
This would also further explain why it may be difficult to identify relationships between
neuroticism and health: perhaps only vigilance, a specific component of anxiety, a specific
component of neuroticism, is associated with these health outcomes. Future research
should include the improvement of measurement of body vigilance and the subsequent
inclusion of this construct in studies of neuroticism and health.
In addition to examining specific facets or constructs, we should also continue to
examine state level emotions and their relationship to neuroticism. Recent advances in
experience sampling methodology have allowed for frequent and specific measurements of
moods and emotions that were not possible a decade ago. Even more recently, new ways to
think about these momentary assessments have generated better ways to evaluate
differences in emotion. Theories of the “dynamics of affect” posit that individuals can be
characterized by not only their average levels of affect, but how their affect states vary and
change over time. These dynamics include affective variability, instability, inertia and
reactivity (Ong and Ram, 2016). Variability is the degree to which changes in affect
deviate from a person’s average. Instability is the probability that a person’s affective state
will change from one moment to another and the extent to which they change. Inertia is
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the degree to which a person’s affective state endures across time (which is similar to
instability but without the level of emotion and with an attempt to capture a length of
time). Finally, reactivity is the magnitude of an emotional response to external events.
Combined, these dynamics can identify, for individuals, whether their affect is stable and
resistant to outside forces, or fragile and susceptible to external influences. Already, these
dynamics are being used in the psychopathology literature, as they are related to
depression, borderline personality disorder and psychopathy (Wichers et al., 2015). There
is some evidence that negative affect dynamics are associated with neuroticism (Jacobs
et al., 2011; Mroczek and Almeida, 2004). But these dynamics are rarely used in health
research, with a few notable exceptions. Positive affect variability has a curvilinear
relationship with cortisol, suggesting that positive affect can be both too variable and too
stable (Human et al., 2015). And positive affect reactivity is associated with greater
mortality (Mroczek et al., 2015). Future research on neuroticism and health should
consider the degree to which neuroticism is related to the dynamics of positive and
negative affect, and whether those dynamics predict health outcomes and behaviors.
Finally, while the interaction of conscientiousness and neuroticism has not been a
consistent predictor of adaptive outcomes, we should continue to look at the combination
of these traits (and the combination of others). Specifically, I think there is fruitful ground
in applying some of the ideas of this dissertation to the interaction of traits. For example,
how might combinations of traits predict emotions or behaviors? How might a combination
of traits predict a response to a situation? A conscientious neurotic might respond with
more anxiety when facing a health situation, because neuroticism predicts reactivity, or less
anxiety, because conscientiousness predicts less reactivity. These traits could result in a
wash, an average amount of anxiety. Or might lead a person to have stronger reactions




Neuroticism may be the most fascinating of the personality traits. From the earliest
days of trait psychology, we have measured and analyzed and scrutinized neuroticism and
its consequences for our well-being, our relationships, our jobs and our health. We have
found damning evidence that our worst fears should be our own anxieties. Conversely, we
have also learned that our paranoia – or vigilance – is not only justified but will save us in
the end. These confusing and opposing results seem to have lead us farther down the
rabbit hole of neuroticism, as we struggle to find an answer. Is my neuroticism killing me?
Or is it making me healthy? This dissertation, for all its lofty intentions, has not solved
this question.
However, if we are to continue this mad search for neurotic truth, we know a few
places not to look. We know that somatic symptoms, while they make us feel anxious or
angry, do not motivate us to change our behavior. Nor do they trigger different effects of
neuroticism. We also know that some measurements of affect are better than others, and
perhaps we need to be more creative when it comes to defining, measuring and
summarizing emotions. And we know that despite all our talk of vigilance, we haven’t
noticed how much we’ve left that construct out.
As for this health researcher, she will broaden her scope. Extraversion, for example, is
more predictive of mortality than neuroticism, but examined less. And traits outside of the
Big Five, especially more narrow traits or scales empirically created, can be both more
predictive of outcomes and more explanatory of mechanisms. Which is not to say she, this
researcher, will give up on neuroticism. It is fascinating. And the thought that it might not
be so bad helps her sleep at night.
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A. Packages Used
This document was produced using R version 3.3.2. In addition to R and the base














Table A.1: R packages used
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B. Estimates of direct and indirect
effects in Study 1
Direct and indirect effects were estimated using a bootstrapping procedure. For each
iteration of the bootstrap, model 2 (in which neuroticism interacted with symptom to
estimate behavior) was run to estimate the total effect of neuroticism, symptom and their
interaction. Next, the three emotions were added to the model, and the estimates for
neuroticism, symptom and interaction were used as the direct effects. Indirect effects were
calculated by subtracting the direct effect from the total effect. Bootstrapping was run
with 1,000 iterations. Presented here are four tables, one for each behavior, which shows
the indirect effect, direct effect and total effect for neuroticism, symptom and interaction,
with each symptom as a separate row in the table.
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Neuroticism
Symptom Direct Effect Indirect Effect Total Effect
Head and back aches 0.37 [0.02, 0.72]∗ 0.21 [0.10, 0.34]∗ 0.59 [0.24, 0.92]∗
Cold and flu 0.37 [-0.01, 0.73] 0.22 [0.10, 0.35]∗ 0.59 [0.24, 0.96]∗
Digestive 0.36 [0.02, 0.72]∗ 0.22 [0.11, 0.35]∗ 0.58 [0.25, 0.95]∗
Dizziness 0.36 [0.01, 0.72]∗ 0.20 [0.09, 0.32]∗ 0.55 [0.22, 0.95]∗
Menstrual 0.45 [-0.02, 0.93] 0.20 [0.00, 0.44] 0.66 [0.20, 1.14]∗
Hot Flashes 0.10 [-0.28, 0.52] 0.24 [0.06, 0.44]∗ 0.35 [-0.06, 0.77]
Other 0.36 [0.02, 0.72]∗ 0.20 [0.08, 0.32]∗ 0.57 [0.23, 0.91]∗
All 0.37 [0.04, 0.75]∗ 0.21 [0.09, 0.33]∗ 0.58 [0.25, 0.93]∗
Symptom
Direct Effect Indirect Effect Total Effect
Head and back aches -0.46 [-1.41, 0.53] 0.01 [-0.16, 0.18] -0.45 [-1.40, 0.55]
Cold and flu 0.70 [-0.84, 2.40] 0.06 [-0.20, 0.37] 0.78 [-0.84, 2.45]
Digestive -0.59 [-2.56, 1.41] 0.11 [-0.26, 0.49] -0.47 [-2.46, 1.46]
Dizziness 1.34 [-1.76, 4.46] -0.03 [-0.45, 0.56] 1.36 [-1.89, 4.47]
Menstrual -0.98 [-2.70, 1.64] 0.21 [-0.17, 0.68] -0.74 [-2.52, 1.89]
Hot Flashes 0.84 [-3.19, 4.55] -0.71 [-1.74, -0.12]∗ 0.14 [-4.14, 3.42]
Other 0.16 [-3.13, 3.78] -0.29 [-0.73, 0.11] -0.14 [-3.41, 3.58]
All -0.20 [-3.81, 3.79] -0.11 [-0.67, 0.46] -0.27 [-3.99, 3.61]
Interaction
Direct Effect Indirect Effect Total Effect
Head and back aches 0.23 [-0.18, 0.62] 0.03 [-0.05, 0.11] 0.26 [-0.15, 0.65]
Cold and flu -0.30 [-0.96, 0.33] 0.01 [-0.12, 0.14] -0.29 [-0.96, 0.36]
Digestive 0.19 [-0.51, 0.87] 0.03 [-0.12, 0.20] 0.22 [-0.50, 0.93]
Dizziness -0.42 [-1.65, 0.80] 0.11 [-0.14, 0.34] -0.29 [-1.59, 0.89]
Menstrual 0.33 [-0.60, 0.95] -0.06 [-0.26, 0.11] 0.25 [-0.68, 0.89]
Hot Flashes -0.38 [-1.73, 1.15] 0.32 [0.06, 0.72]∗ -0.08 [-1.35, 1.62]
Other -0.09 [-1.73, 1.24] 0.21 [0.02, 0.42]∗ 0.12 [-1.50, 1.50]
All 0.17 [-1.41, 1.61] 0.23 [-0.05, 0.52] 0.39 [-1.18, 1.88]
Table B.1: Indirect estimates of neuroticism and symptom on cigarette smoking
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Neuroticism
Symptom Direct Effect Indirect Effect Total Effect
Head and back aches 0.03 [-0.06, 0.12] 0.01 [-0.02, 0.03] 0.04 [-0.06, 0.13]
Cold and flu 0.03 [-0.06, 0.12] 0.00 [-0.02, 0.03] 0.04 [-0.06, 0.13]
Digestive 0.03 [-0.06, 0.12] 0.01 [-0.02, 0.03] 0.04 [-0.06, 0.12]
Dizziness 0.03 [-0.06, 0.12] 0.00 [-0.02, 0.02] 0.04 [-0.06, 0.12]
Menstrual 0.15 [0.06, 0.25]∗ -0.02 [-0.05, 0.01] 0.13 [0.05, 0.23]∗
Hot Flashes 0.18 [0.10, 0.26]∗ -0.02 [-0.04, 0.01] 0.17 [0.09, 0.24]∗
Other 0.03 [-0.06, 0.12] 0.00 [-0.02, 0.02] 0.04 [-0.06, 0.12]
All 0.03 [-0.06, 0.11] 0.01 [-0.02, 0.03] 0.04 [-0.05, 0.12]
Symptom
Direct Effect Indirect Effect Total Effect
Head and back aches 0.11 [-0.11, 0.34] -0.01 [-0.06, 0.02] 0.10 [-0.12, 0.33]
Cold and flu -0.03 [-0.30, 0.22] -0.02 [-0.10, 0.02] -0.06 [-0.32, 0.18]
Digestive 0.04 [-0.29, 0.37] -0.03 [-0.16, 0.04] 0.00 [-0.33, 0.32]
Dizziness 0.56 [-0.26, 1.49] -0.07 [-0.36, 0.06] 0.48 [-0.35, 1.31]
Menstrual -0.02 [-0.39, 0.35] -0.02 [-0.15, 0.05] -0.04 [-0.42, 0.34]
Hot Flashes 0.57 [-0.30, 1.80] -0.05 [-0.37, 0.06] 0.49 [-0.36, 1.65]
Other 0.16 [-0.47, 0.82] 0.00 [-0.03, 0.03] 0.16 [-0.47, 0.82]
All 0.34 [-0.32, 1.00] -0.07 [-0.41, 0.19] 0.25 [-0.40, 0.96]
Interaction
Direct Effect Indirect Effect Total Effect
Head and back aches -0.06 [-0.15, 0.02] 0.00 [-0.01, 0.02] -0.06 [-0.15, 0.03]
Cold and flu 0.01 [-0.10, 0.11] 0.01 [-0.01, 0.04] 0.02 [-0.08, 0.12]
Digestive -0.04 [-0.17, 0.09] 0.01 [-0.01, 0.06] -0.03 [-0.16, 0.10]
Dizziness -0.26 [-0.62, 0.07] 0.03 [-0.02, 0.13] -0.23 [-0.57, 0.09]
Menstrual 0.00 [-0.14, 0.14] 0.00 [-0.02, 0.04] 0.01 [-0.13, 0.14]
Hot Flashes -0.21 [-0.67, 0.11] 0.01 [-0.03, 0.10] -0.20 [-0.62, 0.13]
Other -0.09 [-0.35, 0.18] 0.00 [-0.02, 0.01] -0.08 [-0.35, 0.17]
All -0.21 [-0.51, 0.08] 0.01 [-0.10, 0.15] -0.20 [-0.51, 0.09]
Table B.2: Indirect estimates of neuroticism and symptom on alcohol consumption
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Neuroticism
Symptom Direct Effect Indirect Effect Total Effect
Head and back aches 0.01 [-0.04, 0.06] 0.00 [-0.02, 0.02] 0.01 [-0.04, 0.06]
Cold and flu 0.01 [-0.04, 0.06] 0.01 [-0.01, 0.02] 0.01 [-0.04, 0.06]
Digestive 0.01 [-0.05, 0.06] 0.00 [-0.01, 0.02] 0.01 [-0.04, 0.06]
Dizziness 0.01 [-0.04, 0.06] 0.00 [-0.01, 0.02] 0.01 [-0.04, 0.06]
Menstrual -0.02 [-0.10, 0.06] 0.00 [-0.02, 0.02] -0.02 [-0.10, 0.06]
Hot Flashes 0.03 [-0.04, 0.09] 0.01 [-0.01, 0.04] 0.04 [-0.03, 0.10]
Other 0.01 [-0.05, 0.07] 0.00 [-0.01, 0.02] 0.01 [-0.04, 0.06]
All 0.02 [-0.04, 0.07] 0.00 [-0.02, 0.01] 0.01 [-0.04, 0.06]
Symptom
Direct Effect Indirect Effect Total Effect
Head and back aches 0.02 [-0.14, 0.17] 0.01 [0.00, 0.02] 0.02 [-0.13, 0.18]
Cold and flu -0.20 [-0.50, 0.06] 0.00 [-0.01, 0.02] -0.20 [-0.49, 0.06]
Digestive -0.34 [-0.70, 0.00] 0.01 [-0.02, 0.05] -0.33 [-0.69, 0.02]
Dizziness -0.07 [-0.62, 0.54] 0.00 [-0.04, 0.05] -0.06 [-0.61, 0.53]
Menstrual 0.09 [-0.23, 0.40] 0.00 [-0.03, 0.02] 0.09 [-0.22, 0.39]
Hot Flashes 0.10 [-0.60, 0.79] -0.05 [-0.14, 0.01] 0.05 [-0.68, 0.75]
Other 0.30 [-0.18, 0.74] 0.00 [-0.02, 0.02] 0.30 [-0.17, 0.74]
All -0.23 [-0.83, 0.38] 0.02 [-0.03, 0.09] -0.21 [-0.79, 0.38]
Interaction
Direct Effect Indirect Effect Total Effect
Head and back aches 0.04 [-0.03, 0.12] 0.00 [-0.01, 0.00] 0.04 [-0.03, 0.11]
Cold and flu 0.09 [-0.03, 0.23] 0.00 [-0.01, 0.01] 0.09 [-0.03, 0.24]
Digestive 0.13 [0.00, 0.28] 0.00 [-0.02, 0.01] 0.13 [-0.01, 0.27]
Dizziness 0.06 [-0.18, 0.28] 0.00 [-0.02, 0.02] 0.06 [-0.18, 0.28]
Menstrual -0.02 [-0.14, 0.09] 0.00 [-0.01, 0.01] -0.02 [-0.13, 0.09]
Hot Flashes 0.03 [-0.25, 0.35] 0.02 [0.00, 0.06] 0.05 [-0.22, 0.37]
Other -0.05 [-0.24, 0.16] 0.00 [-0.01, 0.01] -0.05 [-0.24, 0.17]
All 0.25 [-0.02, 0.53] -0.01 [-0.04, 0.02] 0.24 [-0.02, 0.51]
Table B.3: Indirect estimates of neuroticism and symptom on vigorous exercise
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Neuroticism
Symptom Direct Effect Indirect Effect Total Effect
Head and back aches 0.03 [-0.01, 0.08] -0.02 [-0.03, 0.00] 0.02 [-0.03, 0.06]
Cold and flu 0.03 [-0.01, 0.08] -0.02 [-0.03, 0.00] 0.02 [-0.02, 0.06]
Digestive 0.03 [-0.01, 0.08] -0.01 [-0.03, 0.00] 0.02 [-0.02, 0.06]
Dizziness 0.03 [-0.01, 0.08] -0.02 [-0.03, 0.00]∗ 0.02 [-0.02, 0.06]
Menstrual 0.10 [0.01, 0.17]∗ -0.03 [-0.05, 0.00] 0.07 [0.00, 0.14]
Hot Flashes 0.04 [-0.02, 0.11] -0.02 [-0.05, 0.00]∗ 0.02 [-0.04, 0.08]
Other 0.03 [-0.01, 0.08] -0.02 [-0.03, 0.00]∗ 0.02 [-0.03, 0.06]
All 0.03 [-0.01, 0.08] -0.02 [-0.03, 0.00] 0.02 [-0.03, 0.06]
Symptom
Direct Effect Indirect Effect Total Effect
Head and back aches 0.04 [-0.12, 0.19] 0.01 [0.00, 0.05] 0.05 [-0.11, 0.21]
Cold and flu 0.10 [-0.11, 0.33] 0.02 [0.00, 0.09] 0.13 [-0.09, 0.37]
Digestive 0.18 [-0.18, 0.59] 0.04 [-0.01, 0.19] 0.23 [-0.16, 0.65]
Dizziness 0.44 [-0.10, 1.04] 0.05 [-0.01, 0.32] 0.52 [-0.09, 1.18]
Menstrual 0.12 [-0.26, 0.50] 0.01 [-0.03, 0.05] 0.13 [-0.24, 0.51]
Hot Flashes -0.04 [-0.56, 0.54] 0.03 [-0.02, 0.10] -0.01 [-0.54, 0.57]
Other 0.25 [-0.09, 0.59] 0.01 [-0.01, 0.03] 0.25 [-0.09, 0.59]
All 0.42 [-0.22, 1.04] 0.08 [-0.02, 0.37] 0.52 [-0.17, 1.14]
Interaction
Direct Effect Indirect Effect Total Effect
Head and back aches -0.01 [-0.08, 0.05] 0.00 [-0.02, 0.00] -0.02 [-0.08, 0.05]
Cold and flu -0.04 [-0.14, 0.05] -0.01 [-0.03, 0.00]∗ -0.05 [-0.15, 0.04]
Digestive -0.07 [-0.23, 0.07] -0.02 [-0.07, 0.00] -0.09 [-0.26, 0.06]
Dizziness -0.17 [-0.41, 0.05] -0.02 [-0.12, 0.00]∗ -0.21 [-0.46, 0.04]
Menstrual -0.04 [-0.19, 0.11] -0.01 [-0.03, 0.01] -0.04 [-0.19, 0.10]
Hot Flashes 0.05 [-0.22, 0.29] -0.01 [-0.05, 0.01] 0.03 [-0.23, 0.28]
Other -0.08 [-0.23, 0.06] -0.01 [-0.02, 0.00] -0.09 [-0.24, 0.05]
All -0.16 [-0.41, 0.09] -0.04 [-0.14, 0.00] -0.21 [-0.46, 0.07]
Table B.4: Indirect estimates of neuroticism and symptom on hours of sleep
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C. Assigning letter and numeric
grades in Study 2
In study 2, the education study, students were asked each week if they had received
feedback on an assignment, test, paper, etc. If they responded yes, they were asked to
report the grade they have received. This was an open-ended question and students
provided a range of answers. Most common were fractions, percentages and letter grades.
In order to include all feedback reports in each of the models, each report needed a letter
and a numeric grade. First, all numeric grades were transformed to be the percent correct
x 100. (E.g., an 88 indicates that a student received 88% of the total points possible.)
From there, missing information was filled in through a series of rules.
Table C.1 shows the rules used to assign letter grades if a numeric grade was
provided. Numeric grades were rounded down to the nearest whole number, in the case
where the numeric grade included a fraction of a percent. So a numeric 79.7 would have
received a C+ letter grade.
Some students provided letter grades, instead of numeric ones. In those cases,
students were given the smallest possible numeric grade they could have earned to receive
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Numeric Grade Provided Letter Grade Assigned
0 - 59 F
60 - 62 D-
63 - 66 D
67 - 69 D+
70 - 72 C-
73 - 76 C
77 - 79 C+
80 - 82 B-
83 - 86 B
87 - 89 B+
90 - 92 A-
93 - 96 A
100+ A+
Table C.1: Letter grade assigned based on numeric grade provided.
that letter grade. One exception was if a student reported an F, in which case they
received a 50, not a 0. Those values are provided in Table C.2.
Finally, there were instances in which a participant reported that they had received a
grade but did not report what grade it was. In those cases, the numeric grade was imputed
using the following procedure. First, the data were subsetted to include only occasions
where students received feedback on the same type of project (Exam, Paper, Project,
Homework) and had the same response on the question “How did you feel about the grade
you received?”. The average of these numeric grades was found and used as a proxy for the
grade received by the student. This method was chosen, as it was noted that students often
seemed less upset by lower grades on exams than they did about average grades on written
papers. Analyses were run with and without these imputed scores, but no substantial
difference was observed.
Several other rules were established, in the event of odd cases. They are as follows:
• If a participant writes in either the feedback box (i.e., indicates in the open-ended
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Table C.2: Numeric grade assigned based on letter grade provided.
question that they received a grade of some kind but does not write their grade) or
responds to the question “How did you feel about the grade you received?”, the
participant is assumed to have received feedback and their score was imputed (see
above).
• If a participant indicates that grades were curved in some way, the numeric grade is
based upon the letter grade they received.
• If a participant reports receiving grades for multiple assignments, each assignment
consists of one observation. This meant that in some models, assignments are nested
within weeks, nested within participant.
• If a participant reports multiple grades for the same project, the lowest grade is the
one used in the analyses.
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D. Estimates of direct and indirect
effects in Study 2
Direct and indirect effects were estimated using a bootstrapping procedure. For each
iteration of the bootstrap, model 2 (in which neuroticism interacted with feedback to
estimate behavior) was run to estimate the total effect of neuroticism, fedback and their
interaction. In the case of letter grade, the models were unable to run with multiple
situations (i.e., B compared to A, C compared to A, etc.). Instead, a binary variable was
created that was 0 when a student received a B- or better and 1 when they received a C+
or worse.Next, the two emotions were added to the model, and the estimates for
neuroticism, feedback and interaction were used as the direct effects. Indirect effects were
calculated by subtracting the direct effect from the total effect. Bootstrapping was run
with 1,000 iterations. Presented here are four tables, one for each behavior, which shows
the indirect effect, direct effect and total effect for neuroticism, feedback and interaction,
with each symptom as a separate row in the table.
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Neuroticism
Symptom Direct Effect Indirect Effect Total Effect
Received grade -0.04 [-0.24, 0.15] 0.05 [-0.01, 0.10] 0.01 [-0.18, 0.19]
Letter grade 0.11 [-0.04, 0.28] 0.06 [-0.01, 0.12] 0.17 [0.02, 0.33]∗
Number grade 0.21 [0.03, 0.37]∗ 0.01 [-0.08, 0.10] 0.22 [0.06, 0.38]∗
Feel about grade 0.22 [0.06, 0.38]∗ -0.01 [-0.10, 0.08] 0.21 [0.07, 0.34]∗
Feedback
Direct Effect Indirect Effect Total Effect
Received grade 0.11 [-0.01, 0.24] 0.00 [-0.01, 0.01] 0.12 [-0.01, 0.24]
Letter grade -0.12 [-0.27, 0.01] 0.02 [0.00, 0.03]∗ -0.11 [-0.25, 0.03]
Number grade 0.01 [0.00, 0.02] 0.00 [0.00, 0.00] 0.01 [0.00, 0.01]
Feel about grade -0.02 [-0.09, 0.05] 0.00 [-0.01, 0.01] -0.02 [-0.09, 0.05]
Interaction
Direct Effect Indirect Effect Total Effect
Received grade 0.20 [-0.01, 0.47] 0.00 [-0.02, 0.02] 0.21 [-0.01, 0.47]
Letter grade -0.07 [-0.28, 0.13] -0.01 [-0.03, 0.01] -0.08 [-0.29, 0.12]
Number grade 0.00 [-0.02, 0.01] 0.00 [0.00, 0.00] 0.00 [-0.01, 0.01]
Feel about grade -0.05 [-0.16, 0.04] 0.01 [-0.01, 0.02] -0.04 [-0.15, 0.05]
Table D.1: Indirect estimates of neuroticism and feedback on hours studying
Neuroticism
Symptom Direct Effect Indirect Effect Total Effect
Received grade 0.12 [0.06, 0.19]∗ -0.01 [-0.03, 0.01] 0.11 [0.05, 0.18]∗
Letter grade 0.14 [0.07, 0.21]∗ -0.02 [-0.04, 0.01] 0.13 [0.06, 0.19]∗
Number grade 0.10 [0.01, 0.18]∗ 0.01 [-0.03, 0.05] 0.12 [0.03, 0.19]∗
Feel about grade 0.09 [0.02, 0.16]∗ 0.02 [-0.02, 0.06] 0.11 [0.05, 0.17]∗
Feedback
Direct Effect Indirect Effect Total Effect
Received grade -0.04 [-0.10, 0.02] 0.00 [-0.01, 0.00] -0.04 [-0.10, 0.02]
Letter grade 0.05 [-0.01, 0.11] 0.00 [-0.01, 0.00] 0.05 [-0.01, 0.11]
Number grade 0.00 [-0.01, 0.00] 0.00 [0.00, 0.00] 0.00 [-0.01, 0.00]
Feel about grade -0.02 [-0.05, 0.01] 0.00 [-0.01, 0.01] -0.02 [-0.05, 0.01]
Interaction
Direct Effect Indirect Effect Total Effect
Received grade 0.00 [-0.09, 0.08] 0.00 [-0.01, 0.00] -0.01 [-0.09, 0.08]
Letter grade -0.03 [-0.11, 0.06] 0.00 [0.00, 0.01] -0.02 [-0.10, 0.06]
Number grade 0.00 [0.00, 0.01] 0.00 [0.00, 0.00] 0.00 [0.00, 0.01]
Feel about grade 0.00 [-0.03, 0.04] 0.00 [0.00, 0.01] 0.01 [-0.03, 0.05]
Table D.2: Indirect estimates of neuroticism and feedback on hours on social media
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Neuroticism
Symptom Direct Effect Indirect Effect Total Effect
Received grade 0.17 [0.07, 0.26]∗ 0.01 [-0.02, 0.04] 0.18 [0.09, 0.27]∗
Letter grade 0.11 [-0.01, 0.23] 0.02 [-0.02, 0.05] 0.13 [0.02, 0.24]∗
Number grade 0.16 [0.03, 0.27]∗ 0.00 [-0.05, 0.05] 0.16 [0.04, 0.27]∗
Feel about grade 0.15 [0.04, 0.28]∗ 0.00 [-0.04, 0.06] 0.16 [0.05, 0.27]∗
Feedback
Direct Effect Indirect Effect Total Effect
Received grade 0.18 [0.11, 0.26]∗ 0.00 [0.00, 0.01] 0.18 [0.11, 0.26]∗
Letter grade -0.10 [-0.19, -0.02]∗ 0.00 [0.00, 0.01] -0.10 [-0.18, -0.02]∗
Number grade 0.00 [-0.01, 0.00] 0.00 [0.00, 0.00] 0.00 [-0.01, 0.00]
Feel about grade -0.01 [-0.06, 0.03] 0.00 [-0.01, 0.01] -0.01 [-0.06, 0.03]
Interaction
Direct Effect Indirect Effect Total Effect
Received grade -0.05 [-0.18, 0.09] 0.00 [-0.01, 0.01] -0.04 [-0.18, 0.09]
Letter grade 0.06 [-0.07, 0.19] 0.00 [-0.01, 0.01] 0.06 [-0.07, 0.18]
Number grade 0.00 [-0.01, 0.01] 0.00 [0.00, 0.00] 0.00 [-0.01, 0.01]
Feel about grade -0.03 [-0.09, 0.03] 0.00 [0.00, 0.01] -0.03 [-0.09, 0.03]
Table D.3: Indirect estimates of neuroticism and feedback on skipping class
Neuroticism
Symptom Direct Effect Indirect Effect Total Effect
Received grade -0.08 [-0.15, -0.02]∗ 0.00 [-0.02, 0.02] -0.09 [-0.15, -0.03]∗
Feel about grade -0.11 [-0.19, -0.04]∗ 0.00 [-0.04, 0.03] -0.12 [-0.19, -0.05]∗
Letter grade -0.12 [-0.20, -0.05]∗ 0.00 [-0.02, 0.03] -0.12 [-0.19, -0.05]∗
Number grade -0.12 [-0.19, -0.03]∗ 0.00 [-0.04, 0.03] -0.12 [-0.19, -0.04]∗
Feedback
Direct Effect Indirect Effect Total Effect
Received grade 0.14 [0.09, 0.19]∗ 0.00 [-0.01, 0.01] 0.14 [0.09, 0.19]∗
Feel about grade 0.00 [-0.03, 0.03] 0.00 [-0.01, 0.01] 0.00 [-0.03, 0.03]
Letter grade -0.15 [-0.21, -0.10]∗ 0.00 [-0.01, 0.01] -0.15 [-0.21, -0.09]∗
Number grade 0.00 [0.00, 0.01] 0.00 [0.00, 0.00] 0.00 [0.00, 0.01]
Interaction
Direct Effect Indirect Effect Total Effect
Received grade -0.03 [-0.11, 0.06] 0.00 [-0.01, 0.01] -0.02 [-0.11, 0.06]
Feel about grade 0.02 [-0.03, 0.06] 0.00 [-0.01, 0.01] 0.01 [-0.03, 0.06]
Letter grade 0.04 [-0.05, 0.12] 0.00 [-0.01, 0.01] 0.04 [-0.05, 0.12]
Number grade 0.00 [-0.01, 0.01] 0.00 [0.00, 0.00] 0.00 [-0.01, 0.01]
Table D.4: Indirect estimates of neuroticism and feedback on visiting professors
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